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INTRODUCTION 
Purpose and approach 
Three main phases can be distinguished in the development of 
the Finnish national defence following the Second World War: 
1. Establishment of the peacetime organization of the 
Defence Forces 1945 - 1955. 
2. Development of a total national defence to meet the new 
state-of-affairs 1956 -1965. 
3. Introduction of a territorial defence doctrine and 
organization, and the integration of defence policy with 
the security policy, from the mid-1960s onwards. 
There was no sharp break between the three phases, and 
people at the time may not have been aware of any dramatic 
changes about 1955 and 1965. These phases, closely tied to the 
shaping of Finnish security policy, nevertheless, provide a useful 
conceptual framework for a historical study of the evolution of 
Finnish military doctrine. 
Finnish military doctrine has never been formulated in terms 
of specific lines of action or rigid dogmas. In fact, the whole 
concept has been used sparingly, reflecting a general reluctance 
to issue pronouncements in the area of security policy. The 
doctrine must rather be sought in practical actions and in 
individual official and non-official statements. Reports by 
parliamentary defence committees and statements and planning 
guidelines issued by the Government Defence Council can be 
regarded as declarations of the doctrine, but even these were not 
binding and contained only general recommendations. 
Relatively few studies have been done on Finnish post-war 
political and military history, as researchers have principally 
concerned themselves with the role of Finland in the run-up to 
and during the Second World War. The need for a comprehensive 
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general outline of Finnish post-war military doctrine has now 
been recognized. 
In my doctoral dissertation From Total War to Crisis 
Management,' I compared the evolution of Finnish military 
doctrine with developments in Austria, Switzerland and West 
Germany. The present study, which is based on the dissertation, 
is intended for international use and focuses on Finland. 
My aim is to show how the Finnish military doctrine evolved 
and explain the factors determining it. Attention is thus on the 
evolution in its causal setting. The development of doctrine is 
examined in chronological order and from top to bottom, i.e. 
from the security policy (strategic) level down to the operational 
— tactical (battle doctrine) level giving instructions for the 
employment of troops. 
Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of the study is provided by Carl von 
Clausewitz's concepts of the nature of war and the intimate 
relationship between war and politics. Political realism and neo-
Clausewitzian theory allow the original ideas to be adapted to 
serve peacetime strategy and the prevention of war in the nuclear 
age.2 
Neo-Clausewitzian thinking became part of strategy in 
Finland as well as many other European countries, partly through 
national experiences and partly through the French school, 
Raymond Aron and Andre Beaufre in particular. Beaufre's theories 
of total strategy and dissuasive deterrence were early put into 
practical use by neutral countries, but only about the mid-1960s 
did they begin to be incorporated in security policy and defence 
doctrine in Finland. 
Important factors influencing Finnish military doctrine 
include the aims of security policy and strategy, foreign policy, 
the internal and international political situation, threat 
perceptions, military technology, geography, historical 
background and economic resources. Although this study 
generally examines relevant factors in chronological order, i.e. 
according to the progression of events, an exception is made in 
Chapter 1 where the military—political position of Finland and 
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especially the military—geographical factors prevailing during 
the post-war period are described. 
The description of military doctrine pays more attention to 
its realization in practice than to specific pronouncements, which 
in any case has been shunned in Finland. Discovering the real 
situation is also somewhat hampered by the classified status of 
the operative plans and orders drafted for the event of war. 
The doctrine is analysed vertically, from top to bottom, in 
order to take into account the quite different and often conflicting 
logic prevailing on different levels of strategy, as pointed out by 
Edward N. Luttwak.3 To comprehend the doctrine in its entirety, 
it is necessary to examine all the levels: strategic, operational 
and tactical. 
Sources and previous research 
Archival material on the Finnish defence administration from 
1945-1950 is now relatively freely available. The post-war defence 
system, which is largely still in place, was established at that 
time. Though many documents on foreign affairs and defence 
administration continue to be classified, the diaries of President 
J. K. Paasikivi for the years 1945-1956 shed valuable light on 
foreign and defence policy decision-making in this important 
period.' Research on the Kekkonen years, from 1956 onwards, is 
difficult. 
The Public Record Office in London houses a large number of 
documents assisting analysis of the factors influencing Finland's 
strategic position and defence policy. These, as well as material 
in the American National Archives in Washington D.C., have 
been consulted in this study. 
Finland's post-war foreign and defence policies, have mainly 
been examined from the top, as recorded in studies and memoirs. 
Thanks in particular to books by Max Jakobsons the principal 
lines of presidential foreign policy and diplomacy have been 
made public. 
Two new works on defence policy are now available to the 
international community. Risto Penttilä examines in his doctoral 
dissertation the role of Finnish defence policy during 1944-1967 
as part of security policy, and Tomas Ries presents an overall 
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picture of the Finnish defence in his book 'Cold Will' .7 Although 
both deal with it to some extent, neither work focuses specifically 
on military doctrine. My specific aim in the present study is to 
enhance understanding of the operational—tactical as well as the 
strategic part of the doctrine. 
0 
1 STARTING POINT FOR DOCTRINE: 
THE GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION OF 
FINLAND 
1.1 Arrival of the Cold War in the North 
At the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union was left in 
uncontested control of the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean. 
Uncertainty prevailed in the Nordic countries as to the underlying 
intentions of the Soviet Union, despite its efforts to calm the 
atmosphere and secure its own reconstruction. 
The Soviet Union refrained from pressuring Denmark and 
Norway into concessions of territory or military bases, despite 
some suggestions in this direction during the final stages of the 
war and immediately thereafter .8 The Soviet Union withdrew its 
troops from Finnmark in the autumn of 1945 and from Bornholm 
in the spring of 1946. 
A relatively peaceful period prevailed up to the end of 1947, 
when the Cold War began to move into Northern Europe. 
Denmark had initially pursued a neutrality policy favourable to 
the Soviet Union, even to the extent of offering co-operation in 
training. Relations began to deteriorate in 1948, however, as the 
situation on the Continent became more strained and talks leading 
up to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) alliance 
began. 
Sweden entered the post-war period by continuing her policy 
of neutrality and maintaining strong armed forces. She too 
displayed a conciliatory attitude towards the Soviet Union by 
granting a one-billion Krona loan and returning refugees from 
the Baltic republics. At the same time she maintained good 
relations with the West. In late 1946 signs of the Cold War 
became more obvious, Sweden began to explore the possibility 
of a defence alliance with Norway and Denmark. There seemed 
to be a material basis for this in Sweden's strong economy and 
defence capability. An alliance among the Nordic countries would 
also ease the position of Finland by keeping the Great Powers 
out of Northern Europe. Great Britain at first welcomed the idea 
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of a Scandinavian bloc, but both the Soviet Union and the United 
States opposed it. Nor were the negotiations of 1948 between the 
Nordic countries easy, given the diverse interests and growing 
competition between the Great Powers. 
Norway attempted to maintain her neutrality and assume a 
bridge position until as late as 1948, although her ties with the 
West continued strong. However, even in 1947 the deteriorating 
situation forced Norway to explore the possibility of obtaining 
political and armed assistance from the Western Powers or 
Sweden. In the following year Norway negotiated with Great 
Britain and the United States on participation in the future North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and discussions were held with 
Sweden and Denmark on the Scandinavian alliance. Eventually 
Norway decided that the alliance was a weaker option than the 
Atlantic Treaty, which had the support of the United States." 
The strategic importance of Northern Europe to the West 
began to grow with the deteriorating situation on the Continent. 
Assessments made at the beginning of 1947 still did not attach 
great value to Northern Europe. However, in June of that year 
the British Chiefs of Staff Committee emphasized the importance 
of Scandinavia, especially as an airbase but also in respect of its 
industrial and demographic strength." 
The favourable position that the Soviet Union enjoyed 
immediately after the war began to erode in 1948. This was 
largely the result of the harsh Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, 
its opposition to a Scandinavian defence alliance, and the Treaty 
of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) 
signed with Finland. The pressure put on Norway and Denmark 
to stay out of NATO was at least partially effective: although 
Norway and Denmark did join NATO, they refused to allow 
permanent deployment of foreign troops in their territory.12  
Although on the losing side in the war, Finland legitimized 
her international position with the signing of the Peace Treaty in 
February 1947. Despite the large cession of territory and the 
heavy reparations, life eventually began to return to normal. The 
tense situation in Europe in early 1948 was not without 
repercussions in Finland: the Soviet Union took the iniative to 
conclude a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual 
Assistance (FCMA) with Finland and there was threat of a 
Communist takeover like that which had occured in 
Czechoslovakia. After the parliamentary elections in June, the 
Finnish People's Democratic League, which was dominated by 
the Communists, were left out of the Government. The relations 
between Finland and the Soviet Union subsequently chilled. 
Between February 1948 and the spring of 1949 a situation 
emerged that was later to be called the "Nordic Balance". The 
negotiations proposed by the Soviet Union to Finland were 
followed by similar Western advances to Norway. Sweden was 
the country that would tip the scales. The strength of the Finnish 
rebuttal evidently surprised the Soviet Union and had a role in 
improving the bargaining position of Finland in March and 
April. (The situation was analogous to that in March 1940, when 
the offer by Great Britain and France to send an expeditionary 
force to Finland served to speed up the peace negotations ending 
the Winter War). Later on, the concept of a Nordic Balance was 
criticized for being too mechanical and the Finns at least did not 
find it very realistic. Rather, they preferred the concept of "Nordic 
Stability".13  
In spite of its neutrality, Sweden, the key power in the 
North, became the front-line against the Soviet Union on the 
Baltic Sea in the early 1950s. Sweden further strengthened its 
defences, particularly to be able to repel invasion from the east. 
The Swedish Air Force had already been reinforced in the post-
war years e.g. by the purchase of 150 U.S. surplus Mustang 
fighters. The 210 new Vampire jet fighters procured from England 
in 1948 were state-of-the-art. For its part, the Swedish aircraft 
industry started to produce modern equipment both for 
interception and for ground attack. It was estimated that the 
Swedish Air Force, with its nearly one thousand aircraft, could 
successfully repel a major Soviet offensive on the open sea. The 
navy was also considered to have great combat preparedness, 
although its relative importance had gradually diminished. 
Sweden's defence decision of 1948 called for a further 
development of land forces guided to organization and doctrine 
of the armed forces in response to the increased threat to her 
land borders. The policies built on the experiences gained in the 
Second World War continued well into the 1950s, when (in 1954) 
developments of military policy and weapons technology abroad 
suggested the need for nuclear arms of its own.14  
Sweden's armed neutrality provided Finnish security policy 
with something to rest on. By the 1950s, it already seemed feasible 
to emphasize the advantages of Finnish neutrality and the 
importance for the security of the whole of Northern Europe of 
forming a wide neutral zone together with Sweden. The full 
tensions of the Cold War were initially limited to the Baltic Sea, 
and it was only in the early 1970s that the strategic importance of 
the northern sea areas increased dramatically. 
1.2 Features of the Finnish military geography 
The geostrategic position of Finland in Fennoscandia gives it both 
a maritime and continental character. Historically the country's 
strategic importance has been closely linked with her fronting 
on the Baltic Sea. However, the long land borders and the vast, 
rugged terrain, combined with a northern climate remain in the 
end the primary military-geographical features when considering 
the operational — tactical employment of troops. 
Geographical factors affecting strategy in Northern Europe 
and the Baltic Sea region in the 1950s are shown in figure 1. The 
figure demonstrates how the experiences of the Second World 
War affected the conception of naval strategy in the Baltic and of 
the likely offensive operations by German and Soviet land forces. 
Northern railway connections and Swedish iron ore were also 
held important. Signs of the new times were the air routes from 
the west over Scandinavia and the sea route from the Kola 
Peninsula to the Atlantic, vital to the Soviet Union.15 
Almost all of Fennoscandia, in both shape and terrain, is 
difficult territory for land operations, although it bears notice 
that during the Second World War a total of ten divisions were 
operating in Lapland. However, southern Sweden and the coastal 
areas of Finland up to about 100 km inland are areas well suited 
for operations of modern land forces. 
The Baltic Sea was of great significance during both world 
wars, though less significant than the Russians had expected. 
After the Second World War, assessments of its strategic 
importance varied. The Baltic Sea has since emerged as a vital 
transportation route, which in the event of war would be at the 
mercy of air forces, submarines and anti-ship missiles. 
The Baltic Sea is important to Finland in several respects. 
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As a route for foreign trade and internal communication it is 
vital. Population, industry and the public administration are 
concentrated in the coastal areas and in what is known as 
"Maritime Finland", the area south-west of the line joining Vaasa 
and Hamina. The length of the territorial sea boundary (1,650 
km) presents problems for the surveillance of the seas and naval 
defence. 
Physical geographical features of Finland with military 
importance include: 
- the elongated shape (length 1,160 km and width 540 km), 
- the large lake districts in central and eastern Finland, 
- the vast differences between the south and the north in 
terrain, climate and communication routes, 
- relatively low relief of the land, 
- broken terrain in the South, 
- the large proportion of boggy land (20 - 30% of the land area), 
- vastness of the forests, especially in central and eastern 
Finland (the average for the whole country in the 1940s was 
70%, in the 1980s 65%), 
- the small proportion of arable land (9% in the whole country, 
50% in parts of the coastal area), 
- the great differences in temperature and daylight hours 
between summer and winter. 
The limitations placed by weather and visibility on air force 
operations vary widely with season and latitude. While the 
differences between summer and winter are greatest in Lapland, 
they are still considerable in central Finland. 
Post-war demographic development has seen two major 
changes. Population density was greatly increased by the loss of 
Karelia and the migration west of half a million refugees. Then, 
during the late 1940s there was a dramatic increase in the birth 
rate. Another dramatic change occurred in the 1960s when a 
large part of the population relocated in the south, mostly in 
cities and towns, and another large group emigrated to Sweden. 
Relative to the wartime (1940) situation, the population in the 
southernmost province of Uusimaa has now doubled. 
The occupational structure has likewise undergone 
considerable change. In 1940 52% of the population worked in 
agriculture, whereas by 1965 the distribution was 35% in industry, 
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30% in service occupations and only 35% in agriculture. In 1985 
only 13% of the population was employed in agriculture and 
25% in industry. Trade transport and service occupations now 
make up the dominant share. 
A sharp increase of personnel employed in computer 
technology and data communications, i.e. information services, 
occurred in the 1980s. This is not without military implication, 
since surveillance, intelligence, command and weapons systems 
all require competence in modern computer technology. 
Furthermore, the rapid development of the Finnish electronics 
industry has improved the self-sufficiency in communications 
and military data processing equipment. 
The urbanization of the population and the increasing move 
to the service sector, together with the regional demographic 
changes, have greatly influenced the quality and regional 
distribution of reserves, which is of considerable significance to 
both defence planning and training. 
The development of the road network and transport equipment 
has changed the entire life style of the country, and this has also 
affected defence decisions. In the first post-war decade, much of 
the road network was reconstructed or repaired, but even then 
the overall quality remained rather poor. The situation did not 
improve until the building of the major highways in the following 
decade. The programme has since been continued, mainly 
concentrating on qualitative improvements, and the Finnish road 
network is now, at least from the military standpoint, of good 
quality. 
Regional differences in the road network nevertheless remain 
great. The roads in Southern Finland are of Western European 
quality in places. In particular, the road network in the Helsinki 
area is dense and in good condition, serving the traffic needs of 
approximately 800,000 residents. The road network in Lapland 
is sparse, although there has been considerable improvement 
since the war. Logging roads considerably improve the 
possibilities for operational — tactical mobility in Lapland. 
Finland's economic and cultural geography since the Second 
World War has evolved along the lines of Western European 
countries. Even from the operational — tactical point of view 
southern Finland has been compared to Western European 
countries in several studies. 
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Northern Finland is sharply different from both continental 
Europe and Southern Finland. As an operational area it requires 
special equipment and methods. A strategic problem has also 
been created for Finland by the large-scale migration of the 
population to the southern part of the country, at the same time 
as the military-political position of the North has became more 
exposed. 
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2 RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 
DEFENCE FORCES IN THE POSTWAR 
PERIOD 
2.1 The experiences and legacy of wartime 
Finland's defence doctrine after she gained her independence in 
1917 was subject to influences from many directions. The newly 
formed Army had several high-ranking officers who had been 
trained in Russia, e.g. Generals Mannerheim and Nenonen. 
Armaments and fortifications were originally almost entirely 
Russian. Another strong influence came from the Jaeger Staff, 
which had been trained in Germany, and the field manuals they 
brought with them. Furthermore, the victor nations of World 
War I - France, the United Kingdom and Italy - and Finland's 
neutral neighbour, Sweden, all provided trainers and offered 
the Finns opportunities for military studies. 
The tactics of the war years 1939-1945 were mainly based on 
Finnish national thinking and practical experience. Battles were 
fought under radically different conditions, which meant that 
troops also had vastly different experiences. During the Winter 
War, the conditions in Southern and Northern Finland were also 
clearly different. On the Karelian Isthmus, the decisive area, 
position battles were fought, much like those on the Western 
Front during World War I. Finnish troops successfully applied 
original, versatile tactics on the 1,000- km-long eastern border 
between Lake Ladoga and the Arctic Ocean, frequently 
interdicting enemy supply routes with encirclement and 'motti' 
tactics. Often they successfully overcame the enemy, although 
there were also many cases of persistent enemy resistance within 
encirclements. 
The relevance of war experiences is hotly argued in armies 
of all nations, not least in Finland. Most often the target of 
criticism has been methods which, successful in some situations, 
were re-applied less successfully in others. The several competent 
studies on Finnish battle experiences done in the post-war years 
have had significant influence on the subsequent development 
of military doctrine. 
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War experiences based on both the studies and individual 
impressions were used as the basis for field manuals and 
proposals for reconstruction. The experiences of the final year of 
war, 1944, continued to exert the strongest influence and thus 
warrant closer examination. 
The decisive battles in the summer of 1944 were fought in 
the Karelian Isthmus, particularly in the area north-west of 
Viipuri, between about 25 Russian and 11 Finnish divisions. A 
concentrated defensive fire was the primary reason for the Finnish 
victory in the great battle of Tali - Ihantala, when approximately 
20 artillery battalions fired at the enemy formations in one target 
area. Another characteristic, which was profoundly different 
from battles of the Winter War in the same area, was the speed 
of encounters. Battles were often decided in a matter of hours. 
As both the attacker and the defender were forced to manoeuvre 
their troops on short notice and in confused circumstances, the 
command and battle formations changed so rapidly that a rigid 
organization and bureaucratic command became a burden. 
The Finns halted the Soviet offensive in the final battles in 
the North Karelian forests and destroyed nearly two divisions 
with their stand-by encirclement tactics. By contrast, the 
experience of fighting the Germans in Lapland in autumn 1944 
were heavily coloured by the difficult political situation, although 
these experiences in northern conditions were later to assume 
importance. 
The total strength of the Finnish Defence Forces in July 1944 
was 528,000 troops, 36,000 of which were non-combatant women. 
The strength of actual combat forces was approximately 450,000 
men. Land forces comprised 14 infantry divisions and one 
armoured division, five infantry brigades and one cavalry brigade 
(dismounted). 
The strength of the field artillery and the ample stores of 
ammunition could be considered particularly important in an 
assessment of the post-war defence capacity. At the end of the 
war, the field artillery consisted of 85 artillery battalions, 47 of 
them light artillery and 38 heavy. In addition there were separate 
heavy and super heavy artillery batteries. The artillery totalled 
1,025 field guns and 2,12 million rounds of ammunition, i.e. 
2,000 for each gun. 
The war experiences supporting the establishment of Finnish 
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post-war security policy and strategy were highly contradictory. 
And there was little time for objective assessment during the 
ensuing political upheaval. The terms dictated by the victorious 
powers had to be adhered to first, with the Soviet security interests 
as a priority. 
The Finnish experiences of collective security (the League 
of Nations) and neutrality policy, and also of forming a military 
alliance, were discouraging. It was again apparent that, in crisis 
situations, all nations concentrate on their own, often immediate 
strategic interests, and put little weight on international solidarity, 
moral principles or ideology. 
The pre-war planning in the 1930s was based on the 
possibility that the Soviet Union would attack Finland — as indeed 
happened. But neither military nor political leaders had 
anticipated the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union 
in August 1939 and Germany's participation in the blockade of 
Finland. The reliance on Sweden for assistance had not proved 
entirely satisfactory. Nor did the peacetime planners envisage 
that the Finnish troops would need to land at Tornio close to the 
Swedish border in the autumn of 1944 in order to drive the 
Germans out through the north, on the order of the Soviet Union. 
After such experiences strategists found it difficult to believe on 
the stability of any situation. 
Strategy and operative decisions made during the Second 
World War were carefully studied in Finland, and much was 
written on the subject. One of the most interesting events in an 
educational sense was the German attack on Norway in April 
1940. There was a clear strategic logic in this, as in general in 
other operations during the Second World War: for Germany it 
was both necessary and advantageous to continue the war by 
invading Norway. Germany ventured to start a seemingly bold 
operation knowing that the Norwegian defence was weak and 
England would not be ready in time to intervene with sufficient 
strength. For its part, Germany gained important strongholds 
through taking the offensive, and prevented English penetration 
into Scandinavia, which had only just begun. 
The Norwegians themselves determined that there should 
never again be a repeat of April 1940. In addition to their own 
experiences, the Finns had reason to conclude from the events in 
Norway that, during war, or even before it, a strategically 
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important territory will necessarily attract competitive parties. 
Only defence preparedness, maintained over a sufficiently long 
time, can secure the aims of neutrality. At least during the Second 
World War no nation could afford to engage troops in offensive 
operations of uncertain outcome. 
As a legacy of war Finland had gained wide battle experience 
and trust in her own fighting capability and equipment, and she 
had a reserve of trained men for the various service branches, 
especially for the infantry and artillery- based Army. But 
politically and strategically, the experiences were such as to cast 
doubt on the future of a small nation. The heavy losses hung as a 
pall and burdened the economy for years, even decades. 
2.2 Interim peace 
Fighting against the Soviet Union ended in a ceasefire on 5 
September and the Armistice Agreement was signed in Moscow 
on 19 September 1944. The terms of the Agreement contained 
two Articles highly pertinent to the National Defence. First, 
Finland undertook to disband the German troops remaining in 
the country, which led to the devasting war in Lapland. Second, 
she undertook to "place her army on a peace footing within two 
and a half months". 
An Allied Control Commission (ACC) formed by the Soviet 
Union and the United Kingdom arrived in Finland to ensure 
that the terms of the Armistice Agreement were observed. Colonel 
General Andrey Zhdanov, one of Stalin's closest aides and Party 
Leader in Leningrad, came to serve as the Commission chairman. 
Now as the Finns were quite aware, Zhdanov was the man in 
charge when the Soviet Union annexed Estonia in the summer 
of 1940. The Commission had almost unlimited authority to 
inspect any sites they wished and to issue detailed orders 
regarding the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. 
In the autumn of 1944 the Finns were very uncertain as to 
Soviet intentions and possible secret agreements between the 
Allies. All that was known was that the demand for unconditional 
surrender presented to Germany and its allies in 1943, in a joint 
decision by the Allies, did not include Finland. The Finns did 
not then know that the Soviet Union had wanted to conclude a 
17 
final peace treaty immediately and had only consented at the 
last minute, under pressure of her allies, to sign the Armistice 
Agreement.16 
Finland had learned of the heavy terms of armistice imposed 
on Rumania during the same period, including the order to pit a 
minimum of 12 divisions against Germany. While Rumania was 
changing sides, the Germans occupied important positions and, 
in spite of the armistice, the Soviet troops continued their advance 
and went on to occupy Rumanian cities. 
It was during this confused period in September that the 
decision to carry through an earlier planned concealment of weapons 
in scattered caches was made by officers of the General 
Headquarters. Concealment of weapons during troop 
demobilization was contrary to the orders issued by the Allied 
Control Commission to establish central depots, and when the 
operation became publicly known in the following summer it 
created an external and internal crisis. The Soviet Union did not, 
however, react to this in the manner feared. A statement to the 
effect that it was an act organized by the General Headquarters 
and not a conspiracy of "Fascist factions" appeared to satisfy 
them. 
The concealment of weapons and the hasty transfer of 
intelligence materials to Sweden (the Stella Polaris Operation) 
created long-lasting rifts in the relations between the political 
administration and the Defence Forces. Staff relations within the 
Defence Forces also deteriorated significantly. The concealment 
of weapons provided the extreme left with fuel for internal 
political agitation and a propaganda campaign against the 
Defence Forces. For its part, the extent of the organization for the 
concealment of weapons, (arms for 35,000 men), and the many 
still undiscovered caches, provided a warning of stiff resistance 
in the event of an attempted Communist coup or Soviet 
occupation. 
The peacetime organization of the Defence Forces and the 
method employed for the demobilization of reservists led to 
some disagreements with the Allied Control Commission (ACC), 
but these were quickly resolved. It was agreed that the 
organization should basically be the same as in early 1939. On 
their own iniative the Finns also put a stop to the preparations 
for mobilization in January 1945, even though this was not directly 
required by the ACC. 
The organization of the coastal defence and the equipment 
for the Coast Artillery proved problematic and became an 
important issue of security policy. Towards the end of 1944 the 
ACC demanded that the Coast Artillery be limited to one 
regiment and two separate artillery battalions (a total of 140 
guns) and that any guns over 120 mm be transferred to inland 
depots. It also demanded that submarines be disarmed and 
stripped of their navigation equipment. The issue was not 
resolved until after negotiations and correspondence between 
Zhdanov and President Marshall Mannerheim. Mannerheim 
proposed to the Soviet Union that the Coast Artillery should be 
kept in place and that co-operation in naval defence in the Gulf 
of Finland should be begun, in the interests of both countries. 
Zhdanov advised Mannerheim in March that the ACC was 
willing to let the large calibre guns remain in the fortifications to 
the west of Porkkala if Finland would undertake to protect the 
Soviet Navy in coastal waters and when moored in Turku, Hanko 
and the archipelagoes. Submarines would be temporarily 
"conserved", i.e. kept operational but in storage." 
The dismantling of the Coast Artillery to the west of Porkkala 
was thus halted and provisional arrangements for co-operation 
in naval defence were worked out. Discussions were held 
between Mannerheim, Paasikivi and Zhdanov on a permanent 
agreement to cooperate in the event of a new war, modelled 
after the agreements concluded by the Soviet Union with 
Czechoslovakia and France. The matter came to a temporary 
halt in the spring when Zhdanov advised that the Soviet Union 
would make a proposal when the time was ripe.18 
2.3 Military clauses in the Paris Peace Treaty 
Already in the spring of 1945 the United Kingdom had learned 
of the Finnish — Soviet negotiations towards organizing military 
co-operation and possibly even a military alliance. The British 
had also learned of the return of the armaments to west coast 
fortification and they especially feared that the Åland 
fortifications would be put at Soviet disposal.19 The British Chiefs 
of Staff Committee recommended in the summer of 1945 that the 
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peace treaty with Finland should limit her armed forces in the 
same manner as to the other former German "satellites". The 
demilitarization of Åland should also be assured. Although 
Finland was not militarily important to the United Kingdom at 
the time, Scandinavia in general was becoming more important 
to the West 20 
During a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Allied 
powers in London in September 1945 to draft the peace treaties 
for Italy, Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, differences 
became apparent in the views of the Soviet Union and the United 
Kingdom on the restrictions to be imposed on the armed forces. 
While there was general agreement on the restrictions to be set 
on Italy, the Soviet Union did not regard it as necessary to set 
such restrictions on small nations. According to the minutes of 
the meeting (20 September), the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Molotov said:21  
It could not be supposed that Finland could threaten the peace of 
Europe. The Soviet Union, which was the country most directly 
concerned with the possibility of Finnish aggression, had not asked 
for any restrictions on her military establishments in the Treaty 
made in 1940, and did not think them necessary now. Finland 
would never undertake a war of aggression without some powerful 
Ally such as Germany; the correct policy was, therefore, to prevent 
Germany from becoming capable of further aggression, rather 
than to make demands upon Finland, which were not justified by 
necessity and would affront her national pride. 
An agreement on Finland might have been reached had not 
the United Kingdom and the United States held out 
unconditionally for the restrictions because of the situation in 
the Balkans. There was a risk that Bulgaria and Rumania would 
launch an attack on Greece, which was supported by the West. 
The United Kingdom was planning an army of approximately 
100,000 men for Greece and the strength of the armed forces of 
the bordering countries would need to be sufficiently restricted 
to eliminate the risk of aggression. Disputes over the draft 
document and its military clauses continued in secret meetings 
until the actual start of the Peace Conference in the summer of 
1946. After a series of negotiations and ever tougher demands, 
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equal restrictions were set on all former German satellite states. 
Finland was not informed of the military clauses until their 
content was almost finalized, and the proposals for amendment 
that she made to the Peace Conference were then of no effect. 
Against the harshness of all the other conditions of the Treaty, 
the military clauses were not, in the final analysis, felt to be of 
catastrophic significance by the Finns, despite their efforts to 
have the restrictions lightened. In fact the worst penalties, besides 
the cession of territory, were the economic (reparations) and 
political artides. 
The genesis of the military clauses and the interests of the 
various signatories remained unclear to Finnish political and 
military leaders. It was not known in Finland that the articles 
were originally intended only as provisional i.e., to comply with 
the current military and political situation and state of military 
technology. 
The primary responsibility for the general control of 
armaments was to be left to the UN. Any amendments to the 
peace treaties required by the situation or by developments in 
technology were to be carried out under the jurisdiction of the 
UN Security Council as stated in the relevant Article 22' For 
practical reasons, the interpretation of the military clauses, 
nevertheless, began to bend, as the military — political situation 
rapidly changed with the onset of the Cold War. It also became 
apparent that the UN was not able to carry out armament control 
effectively. 
According to Article 13 of the Peace Treaty, signed on 10 
February 1947 in Paris the Finnish Armed Forces, were to be 
restricted to: 
— A land army, including frontier troops and anti-aircraft 
artillery, with a total strength of 34,400 men; 
— A navy with a strength of 4,500 men and ships to a total 
tonnage of 10,000 tons; 
— An air force, including any naval air arm, of 60 aircraft, 
including reserve aircraft, with a total strength of 3,000 men. 
Finland should not possess or acquire any aircraft designed 
primarily as bombers with internal bomb-carrying facilities. 
Artide 18 of the Treaty prohibited the storage and acquisition 
of war material in excess of that required for the maintenance of 
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armed forces as permitted under Article 13. Article 19 required 
that Finland should hand over all excess war material to the 
Allied Powers or dispose of it within one year. 
By 1948 the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had still 
not reached an agreement on the interpretation of the restrictions 
on strength and the excess war material. Finland supplied the 
appropriate information on strength and requested instructions 
for action. The Soviet Union refrained from taking a stand, and 
the Finns were not eager to force the issue. The United Kingdom 
demanded a strict interpretation of the agreement, arguing that 
the restrictions on strength should also mean, in practice, 
restrictions on the maintenance of reserve forces, i.e. a prohibition 
on preparations for mobilization. The 60 aircraft permitted for 
the Air Force should include all aircraft (i.e. also transport aircraft 
and trainers), and the excess war material should be handed 
over immediately the deadline expired. The United Kingdom 
felt that the Defence Forces of Finland, which had just signed the 
Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with 
the Soviet Union, should be as severely restricted as possible.24 
In practice, the United Kingdom was not keen on starting 
an open dispute over this, as she feared foreign policy issues and 
was for several years satisfied with merely commenting on what 
she regarded as improper interpretations of the Treaty, mainly 
concerning aircraft. Finally, in the early 1950s, the United 
Kingdom saw it as unnecessary to press further for strict 
interpretations in the case of Finland, particularly since the 
limitations set on strength had also been exceeded by the other 
"satellite" nations and as the restrictions on the quality of 
weapons were gradually being abolished in the wave of general 
rearmament. 
It is worth mentioning that the strength of the Greek Army, 
which was one of the original standards, had increased from the 
planned 65,000 — 100,000 men in 1946 to approximately 200,000 
men by the end of 1947, showing that the principles of 
"maintaining the prevailing situation" was scarely adhered to. 
The Finns had retained sufficient war material for a land 
force of 15 divisions, e.g. 580,000 rifles, 61,000 submachine guns 
and 20,000 machine guns. By contrast, the equipment of both the 
air force and the navy was already obsolete or worn out by the 
end of the 1940s and no longer met the requirements of the 
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times. Preparations were already underway in other countries 
for the introduction of jet fighters and missiles, although 
development was still relatively slow prior to the Korean War. 
The issue of excess weapons remained undecided until the 
end of 195226 and Article 17 forbidding all "special weapons" 
was uncompromisingly adhered to. An interpretation permitting 
defensive missiles was obtained from the signatory nations in 
1962, and in the 1980s the main signatory nations also approved 
of the acquisition of proximity fuse mines. The original text of 
the Treaty was not amended, however; indeed, the quality and 
quantity restrictions remained in their original form as set down 
in the Peace Treaty.* 
2.4 Defence Review Committee 1945-1949 and the 
principles of the doctrine 
The new military - political situation in Finland after the Second 
World War required that the functions, position and organization 
of the Defence Forces should be thoroughly reviewed before the 
peacetime organization could be established. The Government 
appointed a parliamentary Defence Revision Committee in May 
1945 to carry out the necessary studies. It comprised six MPs, 
most of them from leftist parties, and five military officers. 
The report27 was not completed until the spring of 1949, 
mainly because of the delay in receiving directives and 
interpretations of clauses in the Peace Treaty, the internal political 
conflicts and the signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-
operation and Mutual Assistance in the spring of 1948. However, 
nothing really new emerged during the final stages and the 
report was ultimately based on the work done in 1945 and 1946. 
The Committee was allowed to work relatively undisturbed, 
even though the political situation in the country was strained. 
Although the viewpoints of the members' different allegiances 
were presented, a rather general consensus prevailed over the 
*) On September 21,1990, the Finnish Government issued a statement to the effect 
that the stipulations of Part III of the Peace Treaty (the Military Clauses) had 
lost their significance. 
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major issues. The need to maintain defence capability was not 
questioned in principle. Proposals for keeping defence 
appropriations to a minimum were justified by the difficult 
economic situation and the exceptional post-war circumstances. 
Reviving the morale in military training was particularly desirable 
in order to improve the relations between the working classes 
and the Defence Forces. The aim was to create what was more 
specifically a "people's army". 
The single most important document in the initial phase of 
drafting the basic decision on defence was the Memorandum of 19 
June 1945 issued by General of Infantry Erik Heinrichs.28 He had 
written the memorandum on the basis of discussions held during 
the winter and spring with the President of the Republic and the 
Prime Minister. When the Memorandum was presented, the 
Defence Revision Committee expressed surprise over how 
radically views had changed since the war years. The contents of 
the Memorandum were otherwise confidential for the time being. 
According to Heinrichs, the North was becoming 
strategically important to the Great Powers and it would be 
advantageous for Finland to initiate an agreement of co-operation 
with the Soviet Union, whereby Soviet reserves could also be used 
to defend Finnish territory. The military command had already 
proposed similar co-operation in regard to the naval defence of 
the Gulf of Finland. However, a defence alliance with the Soviet 
Union was not to be recommended due to a conflict of interests. 
Neither had the Soviet Union entered into alliance agreements 
with any other former enemy nation. An alliance would also be 
in contradiction of the reasons for territorial concessions, which 
emphasized Soviet defence requirements. Even an agreement on 
co-operation should not sanction the employment of Finnish 
troops outside Finnish frontiers. The conclusion of a peace treaty 
should also be a precondition for any agreements. 
Basic principles for the establishment of a military doctrine 
began to take shape within the General Staff of the Defence 
Forces in the summer of 1945. Major General K. A. Tapola, 
Director of the War College, argued that while new weapons 
should be taken into consideration, they would not revolutionize 
warfare in the short run. An effective defence capability would 
still be needed (mainly fast deployment forces based on the 
regular army), and it would be advantageous for the country to 
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switch to a territorial defence system, as isolate battles could 
spring up rapidly over an extensive area. Tapola also emphasized 
the importance of a territorial organization, responsible for the 
mobilization of reserves and supported the integration of such 
an organization into the permanent military framework.29 
The principle of territorial defence, with the idea of regionally 
subordinating all defence operations under one unified 
command, received early approval in the Defence Revision 
Committee. The organization of the Civic Guards, as an essential 
part of the National Defence, had during the war carried out 
territorial conscription, mobilization and rear security 
assignments. After the Civic Guards were disbanded in the 
autumn of 1944 the military districts had sole responsibility for 
carrying out the assignments of the territorial organization. The 
political left opposed the territorial organization, however, as 
being too closely identified with the Civic Guards and its polical 
views. A target for defence savings was also sought, as, according 
to calculation, the territorial organization, which was responsible 
for conscription and mobilization preparedness, was tying up a 
minimum of 467 officer posts. 
The issue of the territorial organization and the importance 
of mobilization operations remained somewhat controversial 
during the entire period of defence review. There was, however, 
an effort to smooth the issue by changing the name of the military 
districts to "conscription districts", so that their preservation 
would not later cause any conflict of principles. The Report of 
the parliamentary Committee also sought to integrate the 
territorial organization with the regular troops. 
Even after Finland received information on the draft of the 
Peace Treaty in the autumn of 1946, the General Headquarters 
and the Defence Revision Committee were uncertain of its 
interpretation. Nor did the signing of the Treaty in February 
1947 do anything to clarify the practical implications of the 
restrictions on strength and the obligation to cede "excess war 
material". The beginning of Part III of the Treaty contained the 
following statement: "The maintenance of land, sea and air 
armaments and fortifications shall be closely restricted to meeting 
tasks of an internal character and local defence of frontiers." The 
upper limit of the strength of the Defence Force, 41,900 men, was 
interpreted by the Committee as a applying to the peacetime 
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situation and therefore a large number of reserve troops should 
be trained for wartime defence of the country. 
The Report of the Defence Revision Committee released in the 
spring of 1949 discusses Finnish military-geographical conditions 
and other strategic aspects in detail. The defence capability of 
the country was considered important and the aim of neutrality 
was also mentioned: "It is perfectly clear that no country will 
guarantee our neutrality and territorial integrity without some 
benefit to itself, in other words without gaining advantages in 
one form or another." The aim is to be prevention of war by 
defence preparedness: "Effective Defence Forces can by their 
mere existence prevent an attack on the country and the lack of 
such forces could draw the country into war." This principle is 
analogous to the Swiss "dissuasive strategy", which proved so 
effective during the Second World War. 
The Report proposed a cadre system, based on general 
conscription, although it included some characteristics of a militia 
system. Psychological factors and "popularity" were considered 
to be important and easy to achieve with this system. 
For the basic model of organization the Report recommended 
a "territorial system", with which the regular troops would be 
closely associated. This model would enable a fast and effective 
move from peacetime to wartime organization. 
2.5 1948: a year of defence policy decisions 
The central issue of Finnish post-war foreign and military policy, 
i.e. the country's relations with the Soviet Union, received a 
solution in the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual 
Assistance signed in the spring of 1948. Finnish political and 
military leaders had already negotiated with Andrey Zhdanov, 
the chairman of the Allied Control Commission, during the 
confused situation of 1945. At that time Finns considered it in 
their interest to seek an agreement with the Soviet Union, 
whereby military co-operation would be undertaken in the event 
of a new war, mainly to ensure the naval defence of the Gulf of 
Finland. Finland sought to convince the Soviet Union that she 
had the capability at least to defend its own territory and thus 
protect the north-western Soviet flank, provided that the Finnish 
armed forces were not to be excessively reduced. As a political 
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guarantee, Finland would be willing to sign an agreement 
defining defence obligations as well as conditions for co-operation 
and assistance. This proposal for a military agreement was also 
an attempt to obtain concessions on the terms of the forthcoming 
Peace Treaty. 
At the time of signing the Paris Peace Treaty, in February 
1947, President Paasikivi had stated in an interview with the 
magazine of the Finnish-Soviet Society that Finland would fight, 
in co-operation with the Soviet Union, within its own borders, to 
repel any attack made on the Soviets. Later, however, in the 
tense political atmosphere of 1947, Paasikivi was not prepared 
to sign even a limited agreement on military alliance, which 
might have bound Finland to the emerging Eastern Bloc and 
result in a break off of trade and cultural relations with the West. 
A crucial reason for his change of mind was the conclusion of 
the Paris Peace Treaty with the harsh terms it imposed on Finland. 
It was too late now for any agreement on military alliance to 
bring about the concessions to the Peace Treaty that had been 
hoped for in the spring of 1945. 
On 22 February 1948 Stalin sent an invitation to Finland to 
begin discussions toward the signing of a Treaty of Friendship, 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FMCA). Paasikivi accepted 
the invitation only after long deliberation. A military alliance 
was widely opposed in Finland except by the Finnish People's 
Democratic League (communists).30 At the same time the Western 
Powers were preparing to rally troops to prevent a Soviet invasion 
of Scandinavia and Communist coups in the bordering countries, 
such as the one that recently (in February) had taken place in 
Czechoslovakia 31 Stalin's invitation to Finland in turn triggered 
preliminary consultations on defence co-operation between the 
United States, Norway and England. 
The treaty negotiations in Moscow went well for the Finns 
after all. The wording of the military articles32 as the main subject 
of negotiations, was greatly influenced by the expertise of General 
of Infantry Heinrichs. With hindsight, it can be said that the 
FCMA Treaty, signed on 6 April 1948, corresponded well with 
the political and military reality, satisfying both Finnish and 
Soviet interests. The role of the Finnish National Defence was 
also defined in fairly specific terms, though not specifically 
enough to prevent different interpretations. The contradiction 
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between the obligations set by the FCMA Treaty and the 
restrictions in the military clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty was 
obvious and was to cause considerable worry to the leaders and 
implementors of Finnish security policy in the ensuing years. 
In two fundamental memoranda in March 1948, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces, General of 
Infantry Aarne Sihvo, reported to the President on the feasibility 
and requirements of Finnish defence  .n His main argument was 
that Finland would be able to fulfil her defence obligations 
towards the Soviet Union if she started to prepare for the use of 
reservists as wartime troops and if the procurement of material 
for the Defence Forces was resumed. On 13 March 1948 President 
Paasikivi approved the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Defence Forces, authorizing the General Headquarters to 
again start drafting operational plans and to prepare for the 
mobilization of reserves. The implementation of the decision 
proved to be difficult, however, due to the sensitive political 
situation. 
The President and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence 
Forces also began to reinforce the protection of military 
installations and the state administration. There was reason to 
fear that the arms depots and important targets in the city could 
be taken-over and that the traffic to the Porkkala military base, 
from the Soviet Union, would be disturbed. The Commander-
in-Chief of the Defence Forces informed the Soviet military 
attache of the tightening up of surveillance and safeguarding. 
The preparedness of the Defence Forces for repelling the threat 
of takeover was at its peak in April, after which normal training 
was gradually resumed. 
Studies undertaken since have not been able to determine 
how well founded the rumours of a plan for a Communist 
takeover actually were. The President's tough position was 
influenced by the consideration that provocation by even a small 
group could quickly lead to a crisis to which the Soviet Union 
might choose to react. The Government was determined to 
maintain order within the country at all costs. In this situation 
the Defence Forces proved to be a disciplined and reliable tool, 
playing the role of supporter of the Government's foreign and 
internal policy. 
The uncertainty in internal policy continued for a 
considerable time. In foreign and military policy Finland's 
position began to stabilize, however. She aimed at neutrality 
while maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union in 
accordance with the FCMA Treaty. At the same time she turned 
mainly to the West to satisfy her economic and cultural needs. 
2.6 Conscription Act of 1950 and organizational review 
of 1952 
The Conscription Act of 1932 called for conscription service 
generally lasting 350 — 440 days, but leaves of several months 
were granted after the war was over. 
The Defence Revision Committee proposed in its Report 
that the new Conscription Act should follow the principles of 
the old one, but military service should be shortened. The 
Committee conceded that, in the light of war experiences, the 
proposed terms of duty of slightly less than a year were too 
short but they were justified by the economic situation. 
The Government agreed in principle with the views of the 
Committee. The restrictions set by the Peace Treaty, and at the 
same time the obligation set by the FCMA Treaty "to defend the 
country by all available means", were noted in the Government's 
proposal. The parliament approved the Conscription Act on 2 
June 1950. According to the terms of the Act, the basic term of 
duty would be 240 days, and for specialists and officers 330 
days. In addition, 40— 100 days participation in refresher training 
was to be obligatory. 
The establishment of the peacetime organization proved to be 
a complicated and time-consuming task. A new "training 
organisation", including three divisions and one light brigade, 
had already been put in place in 1948. The Coast Artillery and 
Anti-Aircraft troops were incorporated in the Army for the time 
being. 
The Defence Revision Committee Report proposed several 
transfers of troops and the division of the country into seven 
"national defence provinces" according to the principles of 
territorial defence. Troops were to be moved from the southern 
coastal areas and southeastern Finland so as to shift the centre of 
gravity more towards Western and Northern Finland. New 
garrisons were expensive to build, however, and the transfers 
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could not generally be carried out. 
In his statements in 1950, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defence Forces, General Sihvo, supported the main principles 
presented by the Defence Revision Committee, but he also made 
several comments on their practical implementations. He 
proposed three "national defence districts" (territorial divisions), 
and a brigade organization instead of the "national defence 
provinces" and division/regiment organization proposed by the 
Committee. General Sihvo's arguments for a brigade organization 
were as follows: 
— An improved operational preparedness, flexibility and 
operational capability of the permanent fast deployment force; 
— Improved suitability for securing internal order; 
— Improved organization for peacetime training allowing co-
operation between the branches of service. 
In his counter-proposal the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defence Forces also wished to emphasize the importance of 
coastal defence and, accordingly, to keep the Coast Artillery 
incorporated in the Army. He further pointed out that the General 
Headquarters were the central command, and that both the Air 
Force and the Navy should manage with only small 
administrative bodies. 
In October 1951, the Government adopted the principles 
worked out by the Defence Revision Committee, with certain 
amendments, mainly those proposed by the Commander-in-
Chief. The number of military posts had been the subject of 
continual dispute between the Defence Forces and the politicians. 
The Government now proposed that the total number of regular 
officers and non-commissioned officers be 8,520, which meant a 
1,500-man reduction in posts from the then current strength. The 
Act passed by Parliament on 6 June 1952 substantially followed 
the Government proposal. 
The peacetime organization of the Defence Forces as 
established in 1952 comprised three army divisions with brigades 
and independent units under them. In addition, an armoured 
brigade and other independent units operated under the 
command of the General Headquarters. The Navy comprised 
two operational units and two naval stations. The Air Force had 
three wings, as well as independent units. The territorial 
organization, responsible for conscription and maintaining the 
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preparedness of reserves, comprised seven military areas, which 
were further divided into 27 military districts. The Frontier Guard 
was established as a military organization under the command 
of the Ministry of the Interior. 
The creation of the wartime organization was further delayed. 
This was due mainly to the confusion over the interpretation of 
the maximum strength stipulated in the Peace Treaty, but also to 
the delicate nature of the prevailing political situation. There 
had been arguments within the Defence Forces over whether a 
division/regiment or brigade organization would be better. 
Opinions were also divided on the composition of the infantry 
and artillery units. The decision of 1952 in favour of a peacetime 
organization into brigades still did not entirely end the argument. 
However, training was eventually based on the brigade 
organization. 
2.7 Political difficulties in improving the defence 
capability 
The Defence Revision Committee had urged in its Report that 
defence preparedness be maintained at a high level. It was during 
this time that the military—political situation in the North once 
again became more strained. 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General 
Sihvo wrote two memoranda to the President in the winter of 
1949, in response to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty' 
Sihvo argued that Finland's military—political position should 
be re-assessed. He thought the operational capability of the army 
to be sufficient, and that there were no threats of any serious 
naval operations either, but that the Air Defence was developing 
into a critical issue. The striking power of the United States and 
of the emerging Atlantic Alliance was based on air power which 
would probably also be employed in the North. In the event of 
war, a weak Finnish Air Defence would force the Soviet Union 
to spread its own defence onto Finnish territory, and Finland 
would unavoidably become the target of American atomic bombs. 
Sihvo proposed that radar equipment be quickly procured and 
the civil defence preparedness improved. Preparations should 
also be intensified regarding economic defence in the event of 
war or protracted crisis. 
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Money saving measures and the sale of equipment for either 
civilian use or scrap resulted in a dear decline in the preparedness 
of the Finnish Defence Forces in the early 1950s, especially relative 
to the vast rearmament started elsewhere. This development 
was openly acknowledged by the Government. For political 
reasons, however, it was cautious about taking explicit steps in 
the direction of enchancing the defence capability. President 
Paasikivi deemed the threat of war to be particularly great in 
1951-1953 and was very worried about the weak preparedness 
for defence. He thought it essential that the defence obligations, 
as stipulated in the FCMA Treaty, be met as far as possible by 
Finland herself.35 
The problem for Paasikivi was the uncertainty over Soviet 
intentions. He believed that the vehement anti-defence stance of 
the Communists was orchestrated by Moscow. 36 On the other 
hand, the Soviet Union made it known on several occasions that 
the Finnish defence preparedness was in the Soviet interest and 
important to them. The Paasikivi Diaries Vol. 2 reveal the 
indecisiveness of the Government in the early 1950s over the 
lines of development for the Defence Forces. There was hesitancy 
over initiating preparations for mobilization and reluctancy to 
establish a Defence Council as yet, although it was otherwise 
thought necessary. Paasikivi delayed a long time — until late in 
1952 — before requesting permission from the Soviet Union to 
discharge the central depots. Enough post-war material for more 
than ten divisions was stored in the depots; to bring them into 
use during mobilization would, however, have taken several 
months. 
The extreme caution on the part of both Paasikivi and the 
Government was not only due to the uncertainty over the Soviet 
reactions. Renewing the equipment of the Defence Forces, 
particularly that of the Air Force and Navy, would be extremely 
costly and the economic situation during the final stages of 
reparations and reconstruction was still weak. Increasing the 
defence budget, or even a public discussion of defence, it was 
feared, could trigger political unrest, and for this reason the 
Government carefully avoided emphasizing the needs of the 
Defence Forces in public. 
It is difficult to decide whether, despite of the threat of war, 
it was internal politics that determined the restraint in improving 
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the defence capability in the early 1950s. Quite possibly foreign 
policy issues were simply used as an excuse. 
The organization of the highest command of the National 
Defence was thought to be wanting. President Paasikivi often 
concerned himself with the issue, but no rapid improvement 
could be effected. The problem stemmed from the early years of 
independence. Only the President's constitutional position as 
Supreme Commander was generally accepted, and the division 
of responsibilities between the Ministry of Defence and the 
General Headquarters were the source of much disagreement. 
Questions as to the administration of the civilian sectors in the 
National Defence were also left open. 
The Defence Revision Committee had proposed that the 
General Headquarters be kept as the central military command in 
accord with wartime practice. At the same time they wanted the 
Ministry of Defence to assume more responsibility for defence 
administration and defence policy. This line was followed in 
principle in the reorganization of 1952. The Committee had 
proposed the appointment of a Defence Council, responsible for 
guidelines and the overall direction of the National Defence. The 
Prime Minister had been unanimously proposed as Chairman of 
the Council, but otherwise there was rather divergent opinion as 
to its composition and duties. 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces had urged 
the appointment of a Defence Council in many of his proposals 
to the President and the Government during 1949 - 1951. Both 
thought the issue important but also delicate enough to warrant 
a delay in the appointment. 
President Paasikivi wished to increase the power of the 
Government and its responsibilities in the National Defence, 
while himself still maintaining an active role in defence matters. 
Paasikivi issued an order to this effect in May 1951, saying that 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces should, prior to 
their presentation to the President, and otherwise as well if 
needed, inform the Ministry of Defence on the most important 
matters of military command such as appointments (colonels 
and generals), basic operational, organizational and mobilization 
issues, the conducting of large-scale exercises, agendas for 
consultative meetings, important announcements concerning the 
National Defence and the most important acquisitions. The 
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position of the Minister of Defence also assumed greater 
importance for the reason that Emil Skog, who had held the post 
for several years, was also the leader of the Social Democratic 
Party. 
2.8 Development of tactics 
Given the considerable unfinished business of the war, the 
drafting of standard orders, which would greatly affect the 
development of tactics, was not the most urgent issue on the 
agenda. The War College resumed operations in 1946, at which 
time the studies on war experience actually got under way. The 
concepts of "dense" and "sparse" defence were introduced into 
the instruction given at the War College. And the concept of 
lines of defence was changed to the concept of defence position. 
The defence capability against an all-out attack on Southern 
Finland was understandably considered more important than 
training for "sparse defence". The battles fought on the Karelian 
Isthmus in the summer of 1944 were still fresh in everyone's 
mind. It was generally accepted that a Great Power would be 
able to penetrate any rigid line of defence. Countermeasures 
were therefore needed, and these would have to be developed. 
The troops should learn to fight while encircled and to make 
counterattacks. A solution to these problems was hard to find, 
however. 
In the early 1950s tactics were outlined in the Officers' Manual 
(editions of 1950 and 1953). The Manual was vital for the 
development of tactics, as it was avidly read and its writers were 
serving in the Defence Forces in high-ranking positions. The 
Manual recognized the concepts of total and territorial defence 
as the basis for the National Defence, but the battle doctrine was 
still based on a relatively rigid position defence. Total defence 
was defined to include "military defence, economic defence 
measures, protection of the civilian population and property 
(civil defence) and psychological warfare." 
The National Defence should thus be seen as a common national 
task, where the military sector only represents a certain important 
part. The latter should not be construed as a separate sector, with 
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the sole responsibility for national defence. The supreme leaders 
of the nation, the President of the Republic, Government and 
Parliament, see to it that sufficient preparations are made, already 
in time of peace for the moment when the nation may face its most 
difficult decision, to begin total defence against total offensive.... 
The supreme leaders will also make the important decisions on 
the defence of the country. The duty of the Defence Forces is only 
to carry out the tasks assigned them. 
A clear effort to separate National Defence from other duties 
required in the defence of the country is apparent in this text. 
The overall responsibility for the command of the national 
defence was unquestionably given to the political leaders. This 
was an effort to get rid of the practice in the last war where the 
Defence Forces had the responsibility for administration of the 
civilian sector, e.g. transport and civil defence. 
The introduction of the territorial defence system was reasoned 
on the basis of the 
changed nature of war, mainly the threat of a surprise attack even 
during the initial phase of war, its increasing totality, the possibility 
of internal unrest as well as the great operational mobility with 
deep penetrations and fast breakthroughs, airborne operations 
and amphibious landings. War, previously fought on solid frontier 
lines, has changed into territorial war and now involves the entire 
nation, together with its population and remotest areas. 
According to the principles of territorial defence, all defence 
preparations and the operative command should be combined 
under the territorial command. The role of the General Staff and 
the General Headquarters was to assign the tasks and provide 
the resources for their implementation. However, it was not 
desirable that the territorial defence should get involved in local 
fighting of the troops; the familiar "conventional" wartime tactics 
were instead still to be employed. 
The examples of "dense defence" by a brigade stressed the 
importance of the depth of formation, but also the linear nature 
of the defence. 
The aim is to occupy a territory in depth. The defence of a rifle 
company is dense and efficient when its average deployment 
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covers an area of 1 km2. The width and depth of the battalion 
will then be approx. 2 km, i.e. defence by the battalion can 
be considered dense if it covers an area of 4 - 5 km2. This 
determines the estimated defence area required by a brigade 
in the case of dense defence. 
Should it be impossible to use these standards, for example, 
in the flanks or in areas without roads, a special case of "sparse 
defence" was defined. In addition, "forest area defence" was 
distinguished as a separate category. 
This was almost exactly the same defence system as 
employed in the defence against the general offensive of the 
summer of 1944. The requirements to increase the depth of 
deployment were new but did not represent any decisive change 
towards "defence in depth" or "territorial defence". 
The Field Manual of 1954 and the Infantry Battle Manual of 
1955 followed the principles of the Officers' Manual as decribed 
above and thus continued the practice based on the experience 
gained during the final stages of the war. What was new was the 
emphasis on the importance of terrain when deciding the defence 
position and the main line of defence. Guerilla fighting was also 
presented as important and guerilla warfare was given a chapter 
of its own. 
In that the development of tactics, was still limited in the 
1950s by the constraints of wartime equipment, there was some 
logic in applying the fighting methods of those times. Plenty of 
information was flowing in on foreign developments, mainly on 
the Korean War and the atomic bomb, but it was difficult to 
distinguish fact from propaganda and to draw relevant 
conclusions in respect of tactics. 
2.9 Assessment of the reconstruction of the Defence Forces 
The post-war reconstruction of the Defence Forces took 
approximately a decade to complete. The most important 
decisions were the Conscription Act of 1950 and the ratification 
of the new organization in 1952. In addition to these legislative 
acts, several changes in training were made, mainly based on 
war experiences. 
36 
Defence policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s was 
described even in official connections as shameful. In view of the 
feelings and meagre budgetary appropriations of the time the 
epithet seems justified. However, this does not take the situation 
on the Continent and the changed position of Finland sufficiently 
into consideration. The strength and preparedness of the Defence 
Forces at that time is easily compared with that of its extremely 
high wartime level. It is often forgotten that armed forces were 
being drastically reduced all over Europe after the war and that 
Finland was not located along the main axis of tension. Finland 
still had the material and personnel resources at the beginning 
of the 1950s to form an army of more than 15 divisions, although 
this could not be accomplished very rapidly due to the lack of 
mobilization preparedness. Much of the equipment, e.g. means 
of communication, was also lacking, but there were enough 
arms. NATO had more than ten divisions at combat-readiness in 
Europe, and the Soviet Union perhaps 60. 
Taking into consideration the rearmament, which had 
accelerated in Europe after the start of the Korean War, the 
relative defence capability of Finland was rapidly deteriorating, 
which gave Paasikivi good grounds for worrying. 
The reconstruction of the Defence Forces at the beginning of 
the 1950s nevertheless created a solid basis for later developments. 
The defence system was generally deemed to be working well 
and there was no need to change its principles. The weaknesses 
were mainly in the quantity and quality of the equipment. 
The Defence Revision Committee was instrumental in the 
successful development of the defence organization and doctrine. 
It managed to reconcile the views of the military command with 
the political pressures projected by the political parties. During 
the critical period at the end of the 1940s, the two successive 
Ministers of Defence, Yrjö Kallinen and Emil Skog, had great 
influence in that the Social Democrats quietly but decisively 
adopted a supportive attitude towards the Defence Forces, which 
was further strengthened during the 1950s. 
Government circles finally decided, in 1954, that an 
improvement in the operational capability of the Defence Forces 
required rapid measures. The following year's budget granted 
the first real appropriation for military armaments. At the same 
time the facility for quick and efficient employment of reserves 
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in wartime troops was created. A gradual improvement of 
mobilization preparedness to its high pre-war level was also 
underway. 
The effects of the new global strategy on the Nordic area 
and at the same time on Finland's position were discussed on 
many occasions during the early 1950s. Finland, just as many 
other nations, did not, however, have adequate technical means 
to prevent strategic bombers from using its airspace. 
3 NEUTRALITY POLICY AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF TOTAL 
NATIONAL DEFENCE 
3.1 Neutral countries between the blocs 
Stalin's death in 1953 is generally held to mark the beginning of 
a thaw in international relations. In the years that followed, 
rather wide zone of neutral countries was created between the 
military alliances in Europe. 
The positive attitude that the Soviet Union adopted towards 
neutrality was not, however, a consequence of Stalin's death; 
there had also been earlier signs of change. The Soviet Union 
was not strong enough to keep her outer sphere of influence 
under control and the counteractions begun by the West in the 
late 1940s threatened to roll the Cold War frontier eastward. 
As late as the establishment of NATO in 1949, the Soviet 
Union still opposed the idea of a bloc of neutral Nordic countries. 
Two years later, however, it began to advocate the re-
establishment of neutrality in all the Nordic countries 37 At the 
same time the Soviet desire for a neutral zone in Central Europe, 
including Germany and Austria, was expressed. This was later 
only realized in Austria. 
The forming of blocs at the end of the 1940s and the 
emergence of neutral zones in the mid-1950s was greatly to 
influence the future of Finnish foreign policy and thereby her 
defence doctrine. 
The fact that Finland remained outside the Warsaw Pact 
underlined her special position among the neighbours of the 
Soviet Union. It was true that Finland, along with 22 other 
states, was invited to the security conference in Moscow in 
November 1954. Finland announced, however, that she would 
not participate unless all the others who were invited also 
attended. The states that did in fact participate in the Moscow 
conference met again the following spring in Warsaw to conclude 
a defence alliance. And to this conference Finland was not 
invited. 
The Austrian State Treaty of 15 May 1955 was seen in Finland 
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as a precedent for the concrete acceptance of neutrality. While 
recognizing Austria's independence, the terms of the treaty 
nevertheless imposed a number of economic obligations and 
some restrictions on the arming of troops and on political co-
operation with Germany. The ban on general conscription and 
restrictions on troop strengths which had appeared in the original 
drafts did not appear in the final document, however. On 26 
October 1955, after the occupation forces had left, the Austrian 
Parliament declared the permanent neutrality of the country. 
The easing of political tensions and Soviet efforts to reduce 
her troops abroad were reflected in the return of the Porkkala 
naval base to Finland in accordance with the agreement 
concluded in Moscow on 19 September 1955.39 On the same 
occasion the FCMA Treaty was extended by 20 years. The Soviet 
troops left Porkkala on 26 January 1956, after which Finland's 
prospects of carrying out a policy of neutrality were decidedly 
improved. It was also during this period that Finland joined the 
Nordic Council and was accepted as a member of the United 
Nations. 
3.2 Accelerating discussions on the national defence 
The increasing threat of nuclear weapons helped to accelerate 
the discussions in Finland around the mid-1950s on the 
development of a "total national defence". The Second World 
War was already being spoken of as a total war and there was 
reason to believe that, with the development of ever newer and 
more powerful weapons, future wars would be the kind to affect 
whole nations. 
Articles appearing in the Military Journal show how the 
nuclear weapons issue was also becoming a central topic of 
discussion among the Finnish military, beginning about 1953 -
1955. Foreign developments and discussions on nuclear weapons 
were closely followed and their effects on tactics and the nature 
of war were assessed. 
An article entitled "Our defence preparedness is moving 
into the spotlight" (1954), written by the esteemed wartime 
planner of operations at General Headquarters, Colonel V.K. 
Nihtilä is particularly indicative of the positive change in the 
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Finnish attitude towards the development of a total national 
defence. Nihtilä quoted the examples of Switzerland and Sweden, 
which maintained strong defences to safeguard their neutrality. 
He pointed out the possibility of a race on Finnish territory as a 
consequence of the application of the FCMA Treaty. He 
concluded that there was a need to promote defence willingness, 
to modernize defence planning in general and to change battle 
doctrine into one favouring decentralized fighting. Furthermore, 
civil defence should be made more efficient and there should be 
readiness for a long period of economic defence. 
Nihtilä's view that the FCMA Treaty should be backed up 
by a strong defence capability was by no means unique. Colonel 
Wolf Halsti, for example, had on different occasions given careful 
consideration to the obligations of the Treaty and considered 
them decisive for defence planning. Official viewpoints were 
not publicized in the 1950s, but archival material and Paasikivi's 
diaries, published in the 1980s, show how important an issue the 
military obligations of the FCMA Treaty was for those responsible 
for security policy. 
3.3 Organization of a total national defence 
The most urgent task in getting the plans for the total national 
defence underway was the establishment of defence council, but 
no decision had been made. The Report of the Defence Revision 
Committee in 1949 had indeed proposed a defence council similar 
to the Government Committee of Ministers, in which experts 
other than ministers would have the right to participate but no 
voting right. This proposal was opposed by the Commander-in-
Chief of the Defence Forces, who proposed instead that the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and the Chief of the 
General Staff should be made voting members of the council. 
During the years of delay, the Ministry of Defence and the 
Government held fast to the idea that the defence council should 
be a political body responsible for directing the total national 
defence and not merely a planning committee concentrating on 
military issues. 
A compromise was eventually reached. A decree issued by 
the Government on 21 March 1957 appointed the Prime Minister, 
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Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the 
Interior, Minister of Finance and Minister of Trade and Industry, 
along with the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and 
the Chief of the General Staff as permanent members of the new 
Defence Council. The Council was to be the highest advisory 
and planning body and to advice the President on matters 
concerning the national defence. The responsibilities were defined 
as observing the military—political situation, directing defence 
planning, co-ordinating the various fields of defence, preparing 
budgets and making other development proposals related to the 
defence of the country. 
The development of the national defence legislation was 
initiated with the Civil Defence Act (1958), which took into 
consideration both the experiences of total war (the Second World 
War) and the demands of slowly developing crises. A project for 
the construction of bomb shelters was begun and shelters were 
eventually available for nearly half of the Finnish population. 
Later on, the weakness of the Act was recognized, in calling for 
the construction of shelters in designated urban municipalities 
while most of the rural population was left without protection. 
As the serious threat of long-range fall-out from nuclear weapons 
was already known,40 it seems strange in retrospect that the 
danger of radiation was not taken more seriously in the Civil 
Defence Act. It is even more surprising that, in spite of criticism, 
the mistake remained unamended. 
In the latter half of the 1950s preparations were begun for 
economic defence with creation of a permanent organization of 
economic defence. In the early 1960s the Scientific Committee for 
National Defence, the Planning Board for Psychological Defence and 
Advisory Boards for Communications and Medical Services were 
established. 
A decision was reached on the proposal by the Defence 
Council to organize state-wide national defence courses at the War 
College and local courses in the provinces. The instruction in 
national defence had a great influence on the development of 
defence doctrine, primarily by making it public, since otherwise 
an overview could not have been gained even by persons directly 
involved in the planning. 
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3.4 The depth of defence stressed in the new Field 
Manual 
Military defence planning and training obtained a new 
foundation based on modem concepts of war and of total national 
defence in the General Part of the Field Manual which appeared in 
1958. Here it was stipulated that the total national defence should 
comprise political, administrative, military, psychological, 
economic and civil defence tasks. The responsibilities of the Defence 
Forces were specified as follows: 
- to safeguard the country's territorial integrity and its 
neutrality; 
- to mobilize and deploy the Defence Forces and to protect 
these functions; 
- to carry out military operations. 
The Defence Forces might further participate in maintaining 
public order and security to the extent determined by the 
Government, and might be assigned civil defence and other 
tasks necessary for the country. 
The Field Manual specifies the Army formations as the army, 
army corps, division and brigade, the two latter being the basic 
formations. In accordance with the principle of territorial defence, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces was to have the 
authority to divide the country into national defence areas, 
comprising one or more military areas. The duties of the 
Commander of a national defence area were generally to include 
all military preparations except those delegated to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, plus the command 
of mobilization, concentration of troops and safeguarding of 
neutrality. In the event of a break in communications he would 
be responsible for independently initiating defensive operations 
in his area. The division into defence areas would also form a 
basis for the areas of responsibility during wartime. 
Several stages or situations were distinguished in preparing 
the country for war: peacetime, threat of war, safeguarding of 
neutrality and war. 
The basis for planning the operations for the various 
situations was defined as follows: - "The basic strategic plan 
shall generally be drawn up for a case in which the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons seems probable. If necessary, the strategy and 
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tactics shall be adapted to the requirements of a general nuclear 
war." 
Strategic defence zones were specified over an extended 
area. The troops under the Commander-in-Chief were assigned 
operation zones, within the boundaries of which they should 
carry out the tasks commanded. These would involve offensive, 
defensive or delaying action. One or more defence zones were to 
be chosen in an operation zone, thus to obtain flexibility for the 
defence. 
In the implementation of the strategic defence, the following 
stages were distinguished according to time and place: 
— covering operations, 
— concentration of main forces, 
— stabilization of the situation, 
— operations on the main axis, 
— operations in other areas of the front. 
The importance of offensive action and guerilla fighting 
was stressed in all military operations (including defence). At an 
opportune time a strategic offensive should be undertaken in 
order to defeat the enemy. This would require establishing 
superiority at least locally. In a disadvantageous situation 
preparations should be made for either retreat operations or 
guerilla warfare. 
The general part of the Field Manual outlined both the 
strategic doctrine and operational — tactical doctrine, but the 
principles were not very binding or specific. A clear 
recommendation of the principle of implementing military 
operations in an extended area ("in depth") was evident 
nevertheless. The geographical location of the defence positions 
or areas was not defined, but it was later made clear that combat 
should be entered immediately on the frontiers, although at first 
with less strength. 
The Field Manual Part I of 1963 provided fairly detailed 
instructions for the operations and battles of the formations. 
Here the formations were defined as the army and the brigade; 
the division had been dropped out. The general principles of 
strategic defence were not dealt with in this Manual. Quoting 
the introduction to the Manual: "The use of nuclear explosives 
and other combat agents by the enemy has been taken into 
consideration in our planning, and procedures have been 
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designed accordingly, adapted to the conditions of our country". 
The discussion of the use of nuclear weapons and the 
countermeasures to be taken was limited, however, and it could 
not be said that the Manual put particular emphasis on nuclear 
weapons. The main emphasis was rather on repelling a general 
offensive deep in the defence area (on two lines) and on active 
counter-operations to defeat the enemy. Manoeuvres and 
deployment areas were precisely specified, often mentioning 
even map scales. 
As a whole, the 1963 Field Manual Part I can be considered 
to provide a clear framework for the further development of 
tactics. The operational principles described required training 
and equipment of high standard. It was questioned whether 
these requirements could be met without a major procurement 
programme and an increase in personnel training. The Manual 
represented a last effort to adapt the operational — tactical 
experiences and combat methods of the Second World War to 
the requirements of the nuclear age and the overall development 
of military technology. The contradiction between the needs of 
the time and the lack of resources manifested in the old 
operational — tactical doctrines began to be apparent. 
3.5 Development of the Defence Forces in the 1960s 
About 1960, in the face of the military build-up in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Berlin crisis precipitated by the Soviet 
Union and the otherwise changing military situation, the 
leadership of the Defence Forces took steps to eliminate the 
deficiencies in material. There was also an attempt to demonstrate 
the role of the Defence Forces in support of the neutrality policy. 
Replacing of the worn-out equipment of the Air Force began 
in the mid-1950s, when Finland acquired a few jet trainers and 
interceptors. The air control radar system was also expanded to 
cover the entire country, and basic acquisitions made possible 
the domestic manufacture of new anti-tank weapons (light and 
heavy recoilless guns) 41 
The trade credit granted by the Soviet Union during the 
period 1959 — 1962 allowed modernizing of artillery and 
armoured equipment to begin and important purchases of 
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interceptors and naval equipment. The crisis in the autumn of 
1961 essentially boosted the appropriations. The acquisition of 
MiG-21 fighters in 1962, following several stages of negotiation, 
was particularly important. On the other hand, the procurement 
of anti-aircraft missiles was delayed out of foreign policy and 
budgetary considerations, although the need for them was 
acknowledged. 2`  
Since the procurements were of significance to foreign policy, 
the following principles were observed: 
— The acquired material should be suitable to Finnish conditions 
and to the strategy and tactics to be employed. 
— Finland should have the capacity to maintain and service the 
equipment, at least at the basic level. 
— Training of personnel for the operation and service of the 
equipment purchased from the Soviet Union should take place 
in the Soviet Union. 
— Besides the equipment, a substantial amount of ammunition 
should be acquired, and usually also the spare parts and general 
supplies required for long-term use and maintenance and in 
possible wartime.43  
The development programme required by the changing 
concept of war and the new emphasis on neutrality was 
completed at the General Headquarters in 1962 and released as a 
document entitled The Development of the Defence Establishment in 
the 1960s (also known as the K programme).` The document 
began with a fairly extensive discussion of doctrinal principles, 
which the following comments and quotes may illustrate. 
In the assessment the nature of warfare, the evolution of 
doctrine (towards flexible response) in the United States received 
special emphasis: 
The continuing nuclear build-up by the Great Powers and the 
development of more powerful explosives is leading to a situation 
where total destruction is an increasingly probable end result of 
nuclear war. This probability constitutes a very strong deterrent to 
the outbreak of nuclear war, which in turn increases the importance 
of deploying conventional arms and the possibility of small nations 
to defend themselves. 
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Airspace was considered to be the most vulnerable sector in 
the military-political position of Finland, but the danger of 
radioactive fall-out was also recognized: 
...it seems probable that, with the outbreak of general war, our 
airspace by the Arctic Ocean would be the target of violations. 
Moreover, a nuclear attack on areas bordering our country could 
result in radioactive fall-out over Finland, or even actual destruction 
by stray guided missiles. 
The military-political position of Finland in Northern Europe 
thus puts her at the mercy of the air and naval strategy of others. 
Nearby air and sea operations could turn Northern Finland into a 
battle ground even at the outbreak of war. In the latter stages of 
war, extensive land, air and naval operations might be carried out 
in our territory. 
Preparations for the prevention of war, neutrality and long-
term crisis were urged as follows: 
- The primary goal in the development of our National Defence 
is to prevent in advance the planning and implementation of 
military operations against Finland and to prevent trespass on 
Finnish territory. 
- The possibility of getting involved in war should nevertheless 
be taken seriously. 
- During the threat of war or actual war, our country is in 
danger of becoming isolated, which would also greatly affect 
the plans for the civilian sector of the National Defence. 
The following goals were set for the National Defence: 
- A capability to repel violations against the Finnish neutrality 
by land, sea and air as well as to prevent aggression through 
Finnish territory or airspace. 
- A constant capability to deter unexpected efforts to break the 
Finnish will and the capability to defend the country. 
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- A capability to put all the resources of the country on war 
footing in case of a strategic general attack. 
- A capability to withstand air attacks, including nuclear attacks 
and the indirect effects of nuclear explosions close to our 
frontiers. 
- A capability to secure the economic subsistence of the entire 
nation, even when isolated. 
These goals, while extremely challenging, were not more so 
than those suggested for Sweden and Switzerland. 
The financing of the 'K programme' was to take seven 
years, and the defence expenditures were to comprise 3% of the 
Gross National Product, i.e. approximately the same percentage 
as in Switzerland. Sweden was at this time spending under 5% 
of the Gross National Product on defence, the Federal Republic 
of Germany 5.5% and England 8%. Relative to what other 
countries were doing, the programme could not then be regarded 
as utopian. The political implementation nevertheless proved 
difficult. 
The 'K programme' and its justifications corresponded rather 
well with the realistic requirements of the military-political 
situation in the early 1960s. It would have required a substantial 
increase in the defence budget for the whole decade, however, 
and political leaders did not readily consent. 
The Government prohibited the distribution of the pamphlet 
describing the programme, published by the General 
Headquarters, but the Defence Council approved the 'K 
programme' in March 1964 after many behind the scenes debates. 
However, the basic procurement bill under preparation for 1966 
- 1971 was not passed. By way of compensation, the Defence 
Establishment was granted certain rights to place orders, 
beginning in 1965, for several years to come. 
3.6 Crisis management and neutrality policy 
The birth of the 'K programme' was closely associated with the 
Berlin crisis and the so-called Note Crisis of 1961. The experiences 
gained by the leadership of the Defence Forces at this time 
served the later development of crisis management principles. 
This period also saw Finland's neutrality policy put into action 
for the first time. 
In the Finnish interpretation, the main events in the dramatic 
summer and autumn of 1961 were as follows: 
— Premier Khrushchev announced at the beginning of June that 
the Soviet Union would enter into a peace treaty with the 
German Democratic Republic by the end of 1961, at which 
time West Berlin was to become a free city. The West protested 
against this. 
— The Soviet Union announced on 21 June the possible start to a 
series of nuclear tests and of an increase in the armed forces 
(evidenced by an increase of approximately 30% in defence 
expenditures and giving up of the planned army personnel 
cuts). 
— The Soviet Minister of Defence, Marshall Rodion Malinovsky 
visited Finland between 23 June and 2 July. 
— President Kennedy announced on 25 July countermeasures to 
be taken by the United States (increase in defence 
appropriations, call-up of reserves). 
— The Berlin Wall was erected on 13 August. 
— A Note regarding the access to Berlin was sent to the Western 
Powers by the Soviet Union on 23 August. 
— On 29 August the Soviets announced a delay in conscript 
demobilization and on 30 August the start to nuclear testing 
on 1 September. 
— An increase in radiation levels was confirmed in Finland in 
September. 
— There were signs of a Soviet withdrawal from the confrontation 
in Berlin during 12 - 23 September. Khrushchev announced 
that the signing of the peace treaty with the GDR might be 
delayed until 1962. 
— President Leonid Brezhnev visited Finland 22-30 September. 
A memorandum was written at the General Headquarters 
to the Defence Council during the summer in response to the 
strained situation in Berlin, and presented at the Defence Council 
Meeting on 11 August by Lieutenant General Viljanen. The 
memorandum proposed several measures, including: 
— A study in co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and military authorities into the implications should 
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enforcement of the FCMA Treaty come into question; 
— Strengthening of territorial surveillance by land, sea and air; 
— A study into the possibility of rapidly improving the 
effectiveness of the air defence; 
— Improvements to the efficiency of civil defence and, in 
particular, radiation detection; 
— Proposals for the use of the rest of the trade credit granted by 
the Soviet Union; 
— Increase in emergency supplies.1`  
The Defence Council agreed to appoint the proposed task 
force to study the measures, but the first meeting of this task 
force was delayed until 30 October. According to Max Jakobson, 
an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, 
communications between his ministry and the command of the 
Defence Forces had been poor, but co-operation improved as the 
crisis escalated 
The Defence Council met several times during the autumn 
and was kept posted on the situation. The need to increase 
defence capability was acknowledged, but initially there was 
reluctance to grant the additional appropriations. The Berlin 
crisis seemed to be calming down and the President travelled to 
the United States to report on Finland's neutrality policy. 
Nuclear testing was also part of the power struggle between 
East and West. Khrushchev boasted that the Soviets possessed 
100-megaton bombs and, to prove it, a series of test explosions 
were carried out, topped with an explosion of approximately 60 
megatons on 30 October on the island of Novaya Zemlya. 
On the same day Finland received a long and acrimonious 
note from Moscow accusing particularly the West Germans of 
stepping up their military activities in the North and finally 
proposing military consultations between Finland and the Soviet 
Union in accordance with the FCMA Treaty.47 
The absence of the President and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, still on their visit to the United States, played its part in 
increasing the confusion in Helsinki. For example, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces was not immediately 
informed of the note by the Government, nor were any 
instructions given for action. 
Soon after the arrival of the note, the Commander-in-Chief 
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of the Defence Forces, General Simelius, convened a meeting of 
the commanders of the national defence areas. Simelius presented 
the view that Finland's capability and will to defend the country 
needed to be demonstrated in her military preparedness. He 
continued: "In the current situation this especially concerns our 
neutrality and safeguarding the integrity of our airspace and our 
maritime and land frontiers.... Legislation should be put in the 
place to ensure that prompt decisions can be made in crisis 
situations.... We should be able to protect our civilian population 
and our vital institutions, so that our society and defence 
capability do not become paralyzed when the events surprise 
us."'8  
On 13 November President Kekkonen received an extensive 
memorandum from General Simelius: "Viewpoints on the Soviet 
Note". It stated that the Defence Forces had stepped up 
preparedness within the limits of the Peace Treaty, but the lack 
of war material was a problem. Enhancing the effectiveness of 
the air defence was now paramount. Immediate procurements 
from the Soviet Union could have a positive effect. A more 
flexible interpretation of the Peace Treaty would be required, 
and the legislation on defence preparedness should be speeded 
up. Plans had already been made for consultations with the 
Soviet Union. Simelius emphasized the need for improved co-
operation between military and civilian leaders. The President 
responded to Simelius that in his opinion the consultation 
proposal could be averted by cautious political moves 49 
A further note arrived from Moscow on 16 November urging 
consultations. President Kekkonen had just dissolved Parliament 
and ordered new elections. He travelled to Novosibirsk for the 
negotiations on 22 November, and on the fourth day a 
communique was sent from Novosibirsk announcing that the 
Soviet Union had agreed to postpone the request for 
consultations. 
Negotiations were held at the President's residence on 14 
December with the main item on the agenda the use of a trade 
credit granted by the Soviet Union. Kekkonen announced at the 
same time (according to Simelius) that in his opinion Finland 
would not be defending the country alone. This surprised the 
Commander-in-Chief, who could . not fully comprehend the 
President's real meaning 50 
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presented by the Note Crisis of 1961 ceased to exist. In addition, 
the nuclear doctrines of the superpowers, backed up by 
intercontinental missile systems, seemed to be functioning as 
deterrents to nuclear attack. The strategic importance of the in-
between areas was therefore decreased. This was clearly pointed 
out by Risto Hyvärinen at a meeting in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in 1965: 
1. The threat of a general war has decisively diminished despite 
the increase in international tension from time to time. 
2. Because of the risk of escalation into general war, limited wars 
in Europe have become most unlikely. 
3. Finland has lost its strategic importance as far as the Great 
Powers are concerned.... Leningrad can now be destroyed 
without the use of Finnish territory and the territory of Finland 
is no longer of vital importance to the defence of the city 60 
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4 TERRITORIAL DEFENCE AS THE 
BASIS FOR DOCTRINE 
The need to expand defence operations into a territorial defence 
covering the entire country had been recognized soon after the 
war, and in the reconstruction of 1952 an appropriate command 
organization was adopted. It was not then considered desirable 
to carry the territorial principle into tactics, however. Battles 
were instead to be fought in a more linear defence formation, 
including counterattacks. 
Gradually the territorial requirement was extended to 
include combat operations, as growing difficulties in initiating 
attacks and defending the rear became apparent. Several studies 
were undertaken at the beginning of the 1960s with the aim of 
developing territorial defence. First it was necessary to set the 
relationship between the units and the territorial organization 
on a more solid foundation. Some new decentralized combat 
methods were tested, in territorial guerilla fighting in particular. 
4.1 Reorganization of the military areas in 1966 
The Commander-in-Chief, General Simelius, approved in 1963 
the principle whereby the command of the earlier divisions and 
military areas and their duties would be incorporated into seven 
new military areas, following the boundaries of the provincial 
civil administration. The plan aroused opposition mainly among 
the inspectors of the service branches of the forces, as it would 
mean the decentralization of administrative responsibilities from 
the General Headquarters to the military areas. Work on the 
plan and the disputes continued for another two years." 
The decree to divide the country into military areas became 
effective on 1 July 1966. The divisional staff headquarters were 
dissolved (along with the commands of the national defence 
areas). The military districts retained approximately the same 
position and boundaries, but the new military areas were 
assigned both the responsibilities of the former area (mobilization) 
organization and the command of the Army. With some few 
exceptions, all military preparations for national defence became 
57 
the responsibility of the commanders of the military areas. The 
Air Force and the Navy, however, remained independent and 
directly under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defence Forces.bz 
Introduction of the military areas placed the responsibilities 
for defence preparations within new geographical boundaries 
everywhere except in Northern Finland and Ostrobothnia. The 
change was most marked in Southern Finland, where a new 
military area accounting for a third of the entire resources of the 
country was formed. 
4.2 Criticism of defence intensifies 
Almost all social institutions had became targets of criticism by 
the late 1960s. The disillusionment was closely tied to ideological 
developments in Europe as a whole, which in turn were related 
to the military — political detente prevailing in Europe prior to 
1968. In Finland, critique on the Defence Establishment, by 
students in particular, continued on the basis of social and 
domestic policies long after Europe's "mad year". 
Internal criticism within the Defence Forces was mostly 
directed towards tactics, which were thought to be both too 
rigid in the face of the changing nature of war and unnecessarily 
offensive in view of the available resources. 
The defence debate in the late 1960s revolved mainly around 
doctrine. The major reason for the crisis in credibility was the 
development of nuclear armaments, which had assumed such 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions that no doubt could 
remain about the destructiveness of a possible nuclear war. There 
was also a substantial increase in conventional troops, although 
Northern Europe, in the opinion of many, remained a "safe 
haven". 
There was also uncertainty over the position and functions 
of the Defence Forces with regard to foreign policy, as was 
especially evident in the debate over defence in the late 1960s. 
This was partly due to disagreement over defence appropriations, 
but another important reason was that the wartime functions of 
the Defence Forces had not been made public. High-ranking 
political and military leaders often resorted to equivocal language, 
thereby sparking strong criticism. 
It later became apparent that even the President had begun 
to worry about the ambiguity surrounding the duties of the 
Defence Forces, but he retained his right to interpret them as he 
wished.°The Defence Council had in fact already in 1962 adopted 
guidelines for the war-time functions of the Defence Forces. 
However, only the preparatory functions during peacetime were 
made public in the National Defence Statute of 1960. 
The peacetime functions of the Defence Forces were: 
1. To promote the defence preparedness of the nation by 
administering military training and by promoting activities that 
improve physical condition and increase the citizen's will to 
defend his country; 
2. To prepare for the defence of the country and to protect its 
neutrality in other ways; 
3. To defend the legal social order; and 
4. To participate in the maintenance of public order and safety as 
prescribed by law. 
The Defence Council had also defined (secretly) in 1962 the 
duties to safeguard neutrality by territorial surveillance and to 
repel territorial violations. The actual wartime functions of the 
Defence Forces were: "...to defend the country and to prevent 
any offensive operations through its territory, thus maintaining 
the freedom to act and to assure the economic subsistence of the 
people." 
In the winter of 1966 -1967 the Defence Council approved a 
document Maan puolustuksemme tienviitat (Guidelines for the 
National Defence), which was published on 26 June 1967. This 
short (12 page) report can be considered the first official 
declaration of Finland's defence doctrine. 
The report defined the objectives of defence capability as 
follows: 
Our country is in danger of being drawn into conflict if general 
war breaks out elsewhere in Europe or if one of the Great Powers 
resorts to a surprise attack to improve its strategic position when 
war appears inevitable. Should such a surprise attack fail, however, 
the consequence might be a prolonged and escalating war. 
Anticipating this possibility, and all the political complications 
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and military sacrifices, a state might instead abandon its possible 
plans of attack. Thus by being prepared to repel a surprise attack 
as well as being ready for a prolonged war, we will develop the 
proper kind of defence capability against all conceivable 
alternatives and diminish in advance the danger of becoming the 
object of aggression. 
This doctrine was clearly aimed at preventing the outbreak 
of war and included features similar to the Swiss "dissuasion" 
doctrine intended to keep possible aggressors outside the 
country's borders and to the French relative deterrence by nuclear 
weapons. Critics of the report particularly complained about the 
vagueness. 
The 'K programme' drafted at the beginning of the 1960s 
was no longer considered realistic after the change in the political 
situation, and in 1968 a revised 'PV programme' was drafted to 
replace it. This programme was not implemented either, although 
the level of defence costs was lowered from the three per cent of 
the Gross National Product, proposed for the 'K programme', to 
two per cent. 
4.3 Territorial defence also as a battle doctrine 
Several studies in the mid-1960s argued that the 1963 Field 
Manual and the organization of Army units it required was 
based on excessively rigid principles and concentrated primarily 
on strength of personnel. The requirements of the times rather 
called for greater preparedness to repel surprise attacks and 
flexibility to react to the rapid turns of battle. Thus the entire 
doctrine, which was based on a strong Army and partly also on 
preparation for fighting in conditions of nuclear war, was up for 
question. 
A leaner organization and improved mobility and firepower 
were offered as solutions to enhance the fighting capability of 
the forces. However, this would still have left unresolved the 
defence of the rear and tying down of the enemy along its 
logistics tail. Neither would there have been sufficient troops 
available for fighting in one's own or the enemy's rear. The 
organization of a local defence system for the military districts 
was proposed as a solution to this problem. A "rear battalion" 
with light arms should be deployed, since conventional combat 
battalions could not be afforded. During this period, solutions 
stressing guerilla fighting and guerilla warfare were also 
intensively studied. 
At the end of the 1960s, a new General Part of the Field 
Manual was drafted to comply with the new division into military 
areas and the emergence of new combat principles that the local 
defence by military districts made possible. The aim of strategic 
defence was defined as "repelling the enemy attack by 
conventional operations with the possibility of resorting to 
guerilla warfare". The earlier concepts of combat zone, theatre 
of war and home base, were abandoned. The military areas 
assumed particular importance in the territorial defence system. 
The combat troops were divided into general operational troops 
and the local troops supporting them, mainly by guerilla fighting 
and covering the rear. Units not participating in combat were 
referred to as support troops. 
The structure of territorial defence was illustrated by a 
drawing (figure 2) showing how the local defence forms a 
cushioning under-structure. The fast deployment forces first use 
delaying tactics to slow down and exhaust the enemy. Then, as 
the enemy is repelled, general (or main) forces start their offensive 
in order to bring about a decision. 
The General Part of the Field Manual 1973 was approved in 
November 1972, when the principles of territorial defence were 
established. The functions of the Defence Forces were also 
established as part of the broader security policy, and the various 
civil defence principles were defined. The revision of the doctrine 
did not bring any signicantly new features to the operations of 
the Air Force, Navy or to the fighting of basic formations. The 
new activities of the military areas and districts required a fair 
amount of planning and training, however. The role of local 
defence was if anything overemphasized in the Manual, and 
methods were specified without sufficient attention to local needs. 
Among the general public, territorial defence was easily confused 
with local defence or even guerilla warfare, even though there 
was certainly no aim to abandon conventional delaying, defensive 
or offensive operations. 
The development of tactics and training suffered for many 
years due to the delay in revising the Field Manual of 1963; 
temporary training instructions had to be resorted to. The Battle 
Manual for Basic Formations 1977 crystallized the principles of 
brigade fighting and described the manner of co-operation with 
local troops. 
Compared with the Manual of 1963, a notable change in the 
1977 Manual was the abandonment of the rear defensive position 
of a brigade, for which there would not have been sufficient 
troops. The rear headquarters were also abandoned and the 
responsibility was given to local troops. The depth of defence 
now constituted essentially a single level, the brigade defence 
position, where 2-3 battalions could be echeloned. The principles 
of defence for brigades were also sharpened compared with 
earlier ones, and the operations of the different arms were 
concentrated in a smaller area, due to the diminished probability 
of the use of nuclear weapons. 
The principles of the 1977 Battle Manual were retained in 
broad outline in the revised Brigade Battle Manual 1984. The role 
of the brigade as a tactical fighting formation was further 
emphasized in the 1980s, while at the same time combat support 
and other tasks required by the operations were mainly 
transferred to the army corps, military districts and military 
areas. 
The Finnish territorial defence doctrine of the 1970s and 1980s 
was briefly as follows: 
— Independent operations by seven military areas supported by 
the Air Force and the Navy provided the foundation. 
— Based on 23 — 27 military districts, the entire country was 
covered by a local defence and mobilization system with good 
combat preparedness. 
— General forces (army corps and brigades) were to be used in 
decisive operations to stop an enemy offensive and repel the 
enemy by defensive, delaying and offensive operations. 
The army corps was a flexibly composed (15,000 — 30,000 
men) operational formation. Under its command were brigades, 
which were tactical formations comprising approximately 7,000 
men each (3 — 5 infantry battalions). 
A territorial battle operation could be divided into three 
stages: 
62 
- Covering operations (securing mobilization and concentration 
of troops) 
- Stabilization of the situation (slowing down the enemy) 
- Decisive battles (defeating the enemy by a counterattack). 
Territorial fighting was not conceived of in terms of rigid 
formulas. The defence of the country could be carried out in 
different ways, depending on the situation and circumstances. 
In Lapland it was possible to be flexible and let the enemy 
advance quite far, whereas rigid defence operations would be 
needed on the southern coast. Defence of the archipelago and 
Aland would require quite different tactics. 
Brigade operations also took on features of territorial defence 
at the beginning of the 1970s. A defence area was assigned to 
each battalion, including sites to be held in all circumstances. 
The orders gave the commander considerable freedom to choose 
the method of fighting. Offensive action by brigades and 
battalions had an important role in the battle doctrine, since 
passive defence could not be successful under Finnish conditions. 
4.4 Parliamentary defence committees 
The increasing debate over defence in the 1960s and the 
difficulties encountered in funding prompted a thorough study 
of the role of the Defence Forces in security policy, with 
recommendations for their development. The first Parliamentary 
Defence Committee reviewed in 1970 — 1971 some of the basic 
issues, which had been proposed during the lively debate of 
previous years. These included the goals and methods of security 
policy, the structure of the defence system and the functions of 
the Defence Forces. 4` 
The Committee approved the principles developed in the 
1960s by the Defence Forces, which, however, more or less 
reflected the established organization. The task of this first 
Committee was thus to review the foundation of the plans and 
to define the requirements. Its Report clarified the upper (strategy) 
level of the defence doctrine and created a framework for the 
development of the lower (operational — tactical) level. The 
Defence Committee Report carried considerably more weight 
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— deteriorating international situation 
— threat of war between foreign powers 
— war between foreign powers 
— armed attack against Finland. 
Four main categories of exceptional circumstances in the 
list were taken as the basis for planning: major accident, economic 
crisis, threat of war and armed attack against Finland. 
An armed attack against Finland was considered the most 
concrete threat, but it was noted that this would probably relate 
to a conflict between foreign powers: 
The aim (of the aggressor) may be to seize transit routes in order 
to reach targets located outside Finnish borders, to utilize our 
territory to gain depth for a defence, or to occupy Finland. 
The Parliamentary Emergency Legislation Committee which sat 
from 1977 to 1979 examined the possibilities for improving the 
legal basis for action in exceptional circumstances. The Committee 
Report, handed down in 1981, was criticized, among other things, 
because the authority to be given to the Government in 
exceptional circumstances was too broad. Emergency legislation 
was not drawn up directly on the basis of the report, but instead 
several partial decisions were made for the preparedness 
planning in different areas. 
The use of military force during a threat of war was presented in 
the Report of the Third Defence Committee in a new way:69 
Finland must be able to regulate her defence preparedness flexibly 
and with as little inconvenience as possible, in accordance with 
the requirements of the threat at any given time. Finland will have 
to be able to intensify border patrolling and territorial surveillance 
in order to extend surveillance coverage to exposed areas. Finland 
must be able to concentrate sufficient forces in these areas to 
prevent the exploitation of her territory and to deter an attack 
against the country. 
Priority was given by the Committee to the development of 
a new type of fast deployment forces:70  
The fast deployment forces must be developed in such a way that, 
during conflict between foreign countries, they will be able to 
demonstrate our ability to protect Finland's territorial integrity, at 
least in key areas. Such a tense situation between the great powers 
and the resultant military threat to Finland may prove to be of 
long duration.... The capability of the fast deployment forces should 
be improved to such an extent that their maximum strength could 
be limited to 250,000 men. The most important part of these forces 
consists of Air Force and Navy combat units and mobile Army 
units, capable of being concentrated in exposed areas. 
The fast deployment forces were to be formed by using the 
peacetime armed forces as a base. They could be readily and 
flexibly supplemented by the reserves. The cadre-based fast 
deployment forces, expanded to combat strength, could then be 
transferred to a threatened area. 
The feasibility and wisdom of maintaining large reserves 
has always been a subject for discussion. The Committee saw a 
need to supply the troops with new equipment and made the 
following comments concerning the main reserves:71  
The number of available reserves will diminish, with the smaller 
size of age groups, to some 600,000 men in the 1990s. In the 
Committee's view, arrangements should be made to enable the 
use of these reserves in a situation where the fast deployment 
forces are not sufficient for deterring and repelling an attack. If 
needed, large reserves will give Finland's defence depth and 
durability as well as protection to cope with unforeseen 
developments. Equipment for reserves not included in the fast 
deployment forces can, however, be improved only on a very 
limited scale. The tasks of these reserves will have to be defined 
accordingly. 
Preparedness was to be maintained at all times and in as 
flexible a manner as possible. The question of funding, however, 
was not settled at this point, as the Parliamentary Defence 
Commission noted in its report in 1986. 
Preparedness for exceptional circumstances was clarified when 
the Government approved the Defence Council Memorandum 
"Principles of preparing for exceptional circumstances" in 
November 1982. As a main principle all authorities were to carry 
on their responsibilities in exceptional circumstances and be 
responsible for relevant preparations. Large organizational and 
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personnel changes in the event of a crisis would hence be 
unnecessary. The Government's statement continued earlier 
efforts to abandon the wartime practices of the 1940s, when the 
Defence Forces had been responsible for many civilian activities, 
such as rail transportation. 
The Commander-in-Chief, General Jaakko Valtanen, stated 
his views on the role of the Defence Forces in crisis situations at the 
Paasikivi Society in January 1984. His speech came after a heated 
discussion on the threat of nuclear weapons to Finland, 
particularly the new Euromissiles. General Valtanen's key 
question was whether Finland had the means to influence crisis 
management and if the Defence Forces had any part in it. 
Elaborating on the role of the Defence Forces General 
Valtanen set the following goal: "We shall not tolerate our 
territory being exploited for launching an attack or for any other 
purposes of war. Should we be unable to control our territory in 
a crisis situation, we would lose the advantages and position 
gained through decades of successful foreign policy". Therefore 
Finland should strive for "the greatest possible defensive and 
preventive capability". 
According to Valtanen, the fear of nuclear war had resulted 
in a situation, where "in a protracted crisis and conflict situation 
the armed forces are rather tools for crisis adjustment and 
management than actual instruments of war.... The position and 
the tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces also can be assessed from 
the standpoint of crisis management." 
Crisis management therefore means that "...we aim to 
prevent, in advance, situations where our external security would 
be threatened. We aim to prevent at all costs our country's 
involvement in war." In practice, this requires a functioning 
decision-making system for defence policy, which in Finland is 
represented by the Government and the Defence Council. The 
requirements for the Defence Forces in crisis management were: 
following of the military situation, a permanent organization of 
experts, an efficient command organization, credible 
preparedness to demonstrate military strength combined with a 
flexible mobilization system, preparedness to defend strategically 
important targets and the capability for fast deployment of 
wartime defence forces. 
These viewpoints on crisis management were received with 
some confusion. On the one hand, criticism pointed out that the 
statements made in the lecture tended to compromise on the 
actual combat capability and to be satisfied with merely a war-
prevention effort. On the other hand, attention was paid to the 
aim of employing management principles characteristic of Great 
Powers, such as the show of force, even in a small country, 
instead of giving priority to political measures to solve the crisis. 
Responding to the criticism General Valtanen again 
emphasized four years later in his speech to the Paasikivi Society 
that measures taken for crisis management by the Finnish Defence 
Forces were aimed at both the prevention of war and to ascertain 
the success of defence, should Finland nevertheless become the 
object of aggression. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENT 
The following evolutionary trends can be traced in the Finnish 
defence doctrine at the strategic level: 
1. The doctrine developed away from the concept of total war as 
experienced in the Second World War towards an emphasis 
on the prevention of war and crisis management. The 
arrangements for total national defence and exceptional 
circumstances were gradually brought closer to normal 
peacetime arrangements in order to avoid sudden changes of 
command and new organizational structures in crisis 
situations, and to clarify lines of responsibility. 
2. The principle of territorial defence became more important, and 
with it the system of local defence was developed. The idea of 
a territorial defence organization was introduced as early as 
the beginning of the 1950s, but a lack of resources delayed its 
realization until the late 1960s. The battle doctrine for the 
Army slowly changed from the wartime concept of line and 
positional defence to comply with territorial defence. 
3. The importance of surveillance and repelling border violations 
increased with the strengthening of the role of air and naval 
defence. 
4. Fast deployment forces (peacetime cadre troops) were regarded 
as important in the 1940s and 1950s. There was an effort to 
improve the fighting capability of the general forces (creation 
of large reserves) in the following two decades, but the role of 
flexibly and easily recruitable fast deployment forces was 
once again emphasized in the doctrine of the 1980s. 
5. The defence of Northern Finland was strengthened. Although 
the initial decisions in this direction were made in the mid-
1950s, it was not until the 1960's that they were carried out. 
The goal in building the defence of Lapland around peacetime 
troops was to ensure a rapid recruitment of forces in a crisis 
situation, to prevent the use of Finnish territory for hostile 
purposes. Efforts to improve the defence of Lapland continued 
in the 1980s. 
There were no sharp turning points in the evolution of the 
strategic doctrine. All the developments mentioned above 
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required at least a decade to become firmly established. The 
defence system has changed very little in principle. In the 1980s 
it continued to be relatively army-oriented and based on general 
conscription and a large trained reserve. 
The main features of the organization of the Defence Forces 
in the mid-1980s are shown in figure 4. 
Figure 5, showing the evolution of the Army battle doctrine, 
illustrates the transformation of positional and area defence into 
territorial defence during the 1970s; territorial defence was further 
developed in the 1980s to take into account the individual 
requirements of the various parts of the country. The potential 
targets on the South Coast are rigidly defended, whereas in the 
central and northern parts of the country there is more room for 
territorial flexibility. Strategic defence has always included 
operational and tactical counterattacks. 
The role of local defence does not show up clearly in the 
drawing. The local defence system based on the military districts, 
which was created in the 1960s, reflected a somewhat similar 
kind of thinking as the decentralization of arms depots and the 
concealment of weapons in 1944: that is, lightly armed troops 
should be formed within the military districts. The aim in 1944 
had been to rapidly establish a rifle battalion in each military 
district to safeguard the mobilization of the general forces, and 
to engage in guerilla fighting should the area fall into enemy 
hands. By the 1960s, the tasks of the local defence had become 
considerably more diversified and there was no longer a need to 
conceal weapons, but the importance of the military district was 
the same. The Finnish solution was by no means unique; local 
defence was in general strengthened in Europe in the 1960s and 
1970s. Developments in Austria, which was in much the same 
position as Finland, were particularly similar. 
The development of the Air Defence doctrine is reflected in 
the changes in equipment and organization. The need to protect 
the Army had led to the integration of the anti-aircraft defence 
into the Army as early as the late 1940s. During the following 
two decades air defence equipment increasingly lagged behind 
that of other countries, and it became impossible to guarantee 
even a satisfactory protection of population centres and fixed 
military targets. Fighter defence in the 1960s was primarily 
developed against territorial violations and as anti-aircraft 
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defence for the protection of combat troops. By the end of the 
1970s the air defence had become somewhat better equipped for 
territorial protection against air-raids and landing attacks. The 
Air Force did not, however, get suitable equipment for ground 
attack or bombing operations. It was considered that proper role 
of the Air Force was to support the fighting of the Army and the 
Navy by concentrating on interception, i.e. in operations against 
enemy ground-attack planes. 
The main tasks of the Naval Defence were to block the sealines 
to coastal targets and to defend Aland. Surveillance of the sea 
area and the defence against territorial violations also became 
important in the early 1960s. The Coast Artillery had already 
been incorporated into the Army in the 1940s and operated 
therefore in close co-operation with the troops defending the 
coast. The operational use of the Navy was not bound to specific 
waters but remained subordinated to the supreme command. 
Two clear stages of change can be seen in the 
interrelationship between Finnish military doctrine and foreign 
policy in the years 1945 — 85. 
First, the re-orientation of foreign policy in the 1940s, together 
with the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual 
Assistance, encouraged the gradual adoption of a territorial defence 
system. At the same time, the restrictions of the Paris Peace 
Treaty and the role of the Defence Forces in maintaining internal 
order increased the importance of the fast deployment forces 
based on peacetime units. Territorial defence made it possible to 
prepare for the defence against an attack from several conceivable 
directions without needing to specify a particular direction in 
advance. It also facilitated rapid defensive action and independent 
operations even in the event of a break in communications. The 
principle of territorial defence was first employed only in the 
command organization, and even this was carried out in two 
stages: the 1950s saw the formation of the national defence areas 
(three divisions) and in the late 1960s these were replaced by 
seven military areas, which commanded all defence preparations 
and combat operations in their respective areas. The principle of 
territorial defence was not expanded to incorporate the actual 
fighting, i.e. tactics, until the 1970s. The strict interpretation of 
the military clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty and a fear of the 
repercussions on foreign policy had prevented any effective 
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preparations for mobilization until the end of the 1950s. 
A second clear change contingent on the interrelationship 
between foreign policy and defence doctrine was the need in the 
face of an active neutrality policy to strengthen territorial 
surveillance and the capability against territorial violations. The crisis 
of autumn 1961 and its political resolution emphasized the 
importance of safeguarding neutrality and the role of the Air 
Force and the Navy in this. Experience was also gained in crisis 
management, although this was not a term used in Finland 
before the 1980s. The priority of foreign policy had been 
acknowledged before, but in the 1960s the Government wanted 
to clearly define security policy and the role of its various 
components. National defence was subsequently defined as an 
instrument of the Government in support of its foreign policy. 
An evaluation of the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
the doctrine is difficult, since the real test, a serious military 
crisis or war, has fortunately evaded us. It is somewhat easier to 
draw conclusions as to the role of the defence doctrine in support 
of foreign policy. 
The reconstruction of the Defence Forces in the early 1950s 
was earlier in this study seen to be for the most part solidly 
based and appropriate. However, international events, especially 
the introduction of nuclear weapons and the increase in the 
importance of the North, soon created the need to update the 
organization and equipment of the Defence Forces and revise 
the doctrine of National Defence. 
The National Defence was cautiously, even secretly 
developed during the 1950s, as if measures taken toward 
organizing the defence of the country would be politically 
questionable. The reluctancy in making the doctrine public also 
may suggest that it had not been thoroughly thought out. These 
quiet measures did, however, harvest good results. 
The great effort that went into the development of tactics 
and training of the Defence Forces could do nothing to ease the 
lack of credibility surrounding the strategic doctrine. This became 
apparent in the autumn of 1961 during the Berlin crisis and Note 
Crisis. The efforts of political leaders and the military leadership 
to clarify the strategic doctrine and to strengthen its material 
foundation, especially in the Defence Council and in national 
defence courses, did gradually result in a rise in the level of 
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defence preparedness. Credibility still remained a problem, 
however. The build-up of nuclear and conventional weapons in 
the defence forces of the Great Powers and their military alliances 
seemed almost to nullify the prospects of a small country to 
defend itself. 
The introduction of the territorial defence doctrine greatly 
improved the credibility of the country's defence in the 1970s. 
The main principles of the defence system were generally 
approved both by the political leaders and by the military 
command, although the details of the doctrine were not well 
known. The rather general unanimity of the parliamentary 
defence committees and the will of the Finnish people to defend 
the country, as shown in opinion polls, expressed approval of 
the doctrine.72 
The doctrine has supported peacetime policies well as is 
evident in the overall improvement in Finland's security position. 
Assessed in this way, the National Defence has served its purpose. 
As noted above, the doctrine has not been put to the test of the 
real crisis or war, and one can only surmise from the known 
facts how Finland might have fared in time of crisis. 
With respect to the military forces capable of protecting her 
security Finland's defence preparedness had diminished to a 
critically low level in the 1950s. The reasons for taking the risks 
were related to both domestic and foreign policy. Meagre financial 
resources had also to be divided among many takers. 
President Paasikivi was aware of the dangers implicit in a 
weak defence. One of his diaries contains a poignant quote from 
discussions with his Cabinet Ministers in October of 1951: "We 
have taken the risk of basing our policy on the assumption that 
there will be no war at this time. Only the future will tell whether 
this assumption was right or wrong. We have not increased the 
strength of our National Defence, it exists in an interim state."73 
There is not yet enough material available for a final 
assessment of whether the decisions made for the management 
of National Defence were appropriate and whether the risks that 
were taken, were fully justifiable. We only know from experience 
that the Finnish foreign policy brought results, the economic 
situation improved and the integration of the nation continued; 
and in that sense the risks had been worth taking. With the 
improvement in the country's economic and political situation 
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the National Defence was strengthened too. Military doctrine 
was moulded so as to support foreign policy in particular, but 
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THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF FINLAND. 
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Defence Forces, Vice Admiral Jan Klenberg 
Seminar on Military Doctrine 
17 January 1990 
Introduction 	1. Finland participates actively in the CSCE process. 
This process is about co-operation and peaceful 
change. Negotiations on military security have 
become an indispensable part of the CSCE process. 
The goal of these negotiations is to reduce and 
eliminate the risk of war by promoting stability in 
Europe. The CFE negotiations are proceeding towards 
substantial results already this year. The CSBM 
negotiations are also characterized by a desire to 
produce significant results, which is eminently 
illustrated by this doctrine seminar. 
2. Finland is a neutral Nordic state. Neutrality is the 
method of Finland's foreign policy. We endeavour to 
stay outside the conflicts of interest between the 
great powers and military alliances. We maintain 
friendly relations with our neighbours as well as all 
other States, and contribute to the security of our 
continent. 
3. Finland's security policy has been shaped by 
geography and history. 
4. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 prescribes certain 
military limitations on the quantity and quality of 
Finland's defence forces. These limitations do not, 
however, prevent an adequate development of our 
capabilities. 
M 
5. In the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and 
Mutual Assistance, concluded with the Soviet Union 
in 1948, Finland provides guarantees that it will not 
allow its territory to be used for an attack against the 
Soviet Union. 
6. We believe that no foreign powers have offensive 
interest in Finnish territory. A military threat to 
Finland could conceivably arise in connection with 
such a major European conflict which would entail a 
risk of involving our territory. Consequently, 
Finland's strategic significance depends on the extent 
to which, in the event of a conflict, Finnish territory 
could be used for military purposes. In order to deter 
any such use, Finland is prepared and intends to 
maintain a credible control of its territory and airspace 
by Finnish forces. It is crucial that our neighbours, as 
other countries, have confidence in our resolve and 
capability to control and defend our territory. 
7. In our immediate security environment, the 
geostrategic focus has since the Second World War 
shifted from the Gulf of Finland to the southern 
part of the Baltic Sea. On the other hand, the High 
North of Europe has gained new strategic importance. 
8. All parts of Finland will be defended. Southern 
Finland with its centres of population, Lapland and, 
of course, the country's airspace are particularly vital 
for our defence. 
9. Interdepence and stability characterize the situation 
in the Nordic region. There are no sources of conflict 
among the five Nordic countries themselves, and 
they respect each other's security policy solutions. 
The absence of nuclear weapons in the Nordic 
countries is an essential factor of stability in the entire 
region. 
10. The Northwest of the Soviet Union, bordering 
Finland and Norway, and the adjacent northern 
waters, are of major strategic significance. These 
areas play, therefore, an important role for the central 
nuclear balance as well as for the security of the 
whole region. For Finland, regional stability is of 
primary importance. 
11. We believe that the defence forces of the neutral 
countries are recognized as a contribution to European 
stability. In this respect, the defence of Finland remains 
an important factor in the North of Europe. 
12. The fundamental objective of Finnish security 
policy is to maintain freedom and indepedence and 
to prevent the country from being drawn into war. To 
achieve this and to prevent the exploitation of its 
territory for hostile purposes Finland maintains a 
defensive capability. In addition, the Defence Forces 
provide a flexible instrument of crisis management. 
Objective of 	13. The objective of Finland's military defence is to 
military defence make it prohibitively difficult for any potential 
aggressor to violate Finnish territory. The task of 
defence is to make an attack not worth the cost in 
terms of time, manpower and equipment lost by 
prolonged engagement in the Finnish direction. 
14. In short, the ultimate goal is deterrence, not 
deterrence by punishment, but deterrence by denial 
of access. The military objective is, therefore, to raise 
the cost of attack higher than any conceivable benefit 
which the aggressor might hope to gain. 
15. In order to make its military defence credible, a 
small neutral state must employ all the resourses at 
its disposal. 
Foundation of 	16. Thus the Finnish Constitution obligates every 
national defence citizen to take part in the defence of the country. Over 
85 per cent of all men, i.e. 30.000 men annually, carry 
out their basic military service, of 8 to 11 months. 
Repeated refresher training is an integral part of the 
Finnish military service. Today, 50 000 men are 
annually called up for refresher training. 
0 
17. According to the Act of 1974, the principal tasks 
of the Defence Forces are, in addition to training: 
— surveillance of the country's land and sea territory 
and airspace, 
— protection of its territorial integrity, and ultimately 
— defence of Finland. 
18. Other significant tasks include United Nations 
peace-keeping activities. Today, Finland is one of the 
largest contributors of troops to the UN. 
19. In addition to military defence, economic 
preparedness and civil defence are an integral part of 
the Finnish national defence effort. For example, 
there are stocks of vital raw materials, oil and 
lubricants to last for several months, should supplies 
from abroad come to a halt. Furthermore, the Civil 
Defence Act obliges every citizen to participate in the 
national effort to protect the population. The Act also 
prescribes construction of shelters. At the moment, 
there are hardened shelters for about 90 per cent of 
the urban population. 
Doctrine: 	20. The military defence of Finland is based on the 
1. Territorial 	concept of territorial defence. In particular, it has 
defence been developed to benefit from the country's special 
geographic and climatic conditions. 
21. The Finnish military doctrine is non offensive. 
The defence of Finland begins at its borders. 
22. The fully operational decentralized command 
and control system provides assurances against a 
surprise attack. At present, the peacetime command 
structure includes military areas divided into military 
districts. Military area commanders have full 
authority over preparations, readiness, mobilization 
and operations in their area. This system enables a 
rapid mobilization in every part of country. 
23. As Finland has no fully combat-ready standing 
forces, but mainly training units, mobilization is 
vital. All peacetime units have two main 
responsibilities. First, they carry out conscript and 
refresher training. Secondly, they also have certain 
readiness tasks. If needed, peacetime forces can be 
reinforced within hours by reservits to form various 
types of combat units. A fast deployment force of 
about 250 000 men, comprising the best-equipped 
Army brigades, the Frontier Guards, the Air Force 
and Navy can be made combat-ready through 
accelerated mobilizing measures within a few days. 
24. The fully mobilized wartime Defence Forces 
consist of approximately 530 000 men drawn from a 
pool of one million trained reservits. Time permitting, 
mobilization will be followed by a period of intense 
combat training. The bulk of these troops will be 
deployed within a week. Sparsely populated areas, 
such as Lapland, will receive reinforcements from 
central Finland. 
2. Territorial 	25. In the concept of territorial defence, the Army 
defence occupies a pivotal position. It carries the main burden 
system 	for repelling an attack. 
26. We have categorized our troops into local and 
general forces. The local forces are equipped mainly 
with light arms and mines. They form a network 
covering the whole country and defend sensitive 
limited targets and perform delaying actions in their 
local surroundings. They are also prepared to carry 
out ranger- and guerilla-type operations. 
27. The general forces of the Amry willb e concentrated 
to defend, hold and reoccupy key areas. While the 
main function of the local forces is to slow down and 
wear out the attack, the primary task of the general 
forces is to repel the aggressor. The system of territorial 
defence is a flexible one, using mobility, battle 
endurance and exploitation of terrain to the fullest 
extent possible. Both types of forces provide support 
to each other in their respective primary tasks. In 
terms of numbers, in the fully mobilized Army there 
will be more than two hundred battalion- and 
company-sized local units, while the general forces 
will include two armoured and 25 infantry brigades. 
28. The Navy and Air Force play a particularly 
important role in safeguarding Finland's neutrality 
and territorial integrity. In defending the country 
against an invasion they have a role complementary 
to that of the Army. 
29. Naval defence is mainly responsible for 
reconnaissance and the surveillance of territorial 
waters, repelling intrusions and delaying amphibious 
attacks. Its duties also include the control and 
protection of sea lines of communication. The 
principal areas of operation are, first, the large 
southwestern archipelago including the Åland 
Islands and, secondly, the inlet to the Gulf of Finland 
and the waters adjacent to the capital city of Helsinki. 
30. Control of the airspace is for Finland — as for all 
countries — an especially demanding strategic and 
financial challenge. 
31. The main responsibility of air defence is to prevent 
violations of Finnish airspace. Therefore, the principal 
tasks of our Air Force are surveillance, interception 
and reconnaissance. In times of crisis and war, the 
limited air defence capabilities will be devoted to 
protecting vital national assets and, thereafter, to 
give support to the Army and the Navy. 
32. The Frontier and Coast Guard units, trained and 
equipped like regular military units, are subordinated 
to the Ministry of the Interior. These units are of high 
professional military standard and can, if needed, be 
partly or wholly integrated into the Defence Forces. 
3. Allocations 	33. Finland allocates currently about 1.5 per cent of its 
GNP to military defence. When such items of related 
expenditure as the Frontier Guards, civil defence and 
economic preparedness are included, the share of 
national defence will amount to approximately two 
per cent of the Finnish GNP. 
34. One third of the military defence budget is 
allocated to procurement. About 40 per cent of the 
defence material is produced in Finland. The rest is 
procured from abroad. Main foreign suppliers are 
the Soviet Union, Sweden, France, Great Britain and 
the United States. 
35. At the moment Finland is reorganizing its defence 
system. In principle, the territorial defence system 
will remain intact, but in order to increase flexibility, 
resources and responsibilities willbe allocated further 
down in the chain of command. 
In conclusion 	36. Self-defence is the inherent right of all States, 
large or small. Every independent State has the right 
to defend its indepence and to safeguard the lives 
and well-being of its citizens. 
37. The Defence Forces are an integral part of the 
Finnish society, and they are firmly anchored in 
history. The Finnish people are today as determined 
to defend their country as they were fifty years ago. 
THE POSTURE AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES 
Statement on item 3.A by Major General Matti Kopra 
Seminar on Military Doctrine 
24 January 1990 
In his presentation of the military doctrine of Finland 
last week, Vice Admiral Jan Klenberg outlined the 
general features of Finland's security policy. Finland 
maintains defence forces in order to safeguard her 
independence, freedom and territorial integrity. At 
the same time we are aware of the obligations of a 
neutral country in this regard. Finnish security policy 
rests on two pillars; foreign policy and defence policy. 
With this security policy we have contributed in the 
past — and will do so also in times to come — to the 
stability in our own region, the Northern part of 
Europe. This, we believe, has also been a contribution 
to the stability of the whole continent. 
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Finland's security policy has been shaped by 
geography and history. Based on lessons learned, 
and tailored to our specific social, economic, 
geographic and climatic conditions, the military 
defence of Finland is a striking example of the concept 
of territorial defence. 
Therefore I am happy to have the opportunity to 
explain today in some more detail the posture and 
structure of the Finnish armed forces, whose defensive 
character no one seems to contest. 
Command of 	The President of the Republic is in charge of the two 
the Military 	most important areas of the security policy of Finland, 
Defence namely foreign policy and national defence. He is the 
Supreme Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces. 
In this capacity, he is advised by the Defence Council, 
whose members include the Prime Minister and 
other cabinet ministers. The Commander-in-Chief of 
the Defence Forces, the highest ranking soldier, is 
directly subordinate to the President in matters of 
military command. Another chain of command stems 
from the Ministry of Defence. In addition, Parliament 
oversees the Defence Forces through legislation, 
especially when passing appropriations for national 
defence. 
The Commander-in Chief of the Defence Forces is 
responsible for military defence. He is in charge of 
readiness, training, procurement and other military 
activities, as well as of research and development. 
The General Headquarters is the command 
headquartes of the Commander-in-Chief. It is divided 
into four sections: the General Staff and separate 
staffs for training, logistics and war economics. 
The Finnish territorial defence system is based on the 
division of the country into seven operational military 
areas, which are further divided into military districts. 
Also the Navy and the Air Force operate within this 
basic territorial framework. The military areas, the 
Navy and the Air Force are under the command of 
the Commander-in Chief of the Defence Forces. 
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According to the Finnish territorial defence system, 
we must in times of crisis or war be able to carry out 
military operations throughout the country. The 
defence of the country begins at its borders. The 
aggressor will be slowed down and worn out, and his 
advance into the vital parts of the country will be 
prevented at all cost. 
Peacetime 	In peacetime, basic and refresher training is carried 
deployment of 	out in garrisons. These garrisons are located all over 
Defence Forces 	the country. Southern Finland with its centres of 
population, Lapland and the country's airspace are 
particularly vital for our defence. 
In Northern Finland we maintain in peacetime for 
training preparedness three light infantry brigades — 
so-called Jaeger Brigades — as well as an anti-aircraft 
regiment and an Air Force wing. 
For the total defence of the country, the main focus is 
in Southern Finland. Our largest industrial centres, 
the main administrative institutions as well as the 
majority of the population are there. For this reason, 
most of the garrisons and peacetime troops are in 
Southern Finland. 
Naval defence includes two components: the stationary 
coastal defence and the Navy. It is responsible for 
reconnaissance and the surveillance of territorial 
waters as well as repelling intrusions and amphibious 
attacks. 
The Navy has two main bases on the southern coast. 
These naval bases function as naval logistics and 
training centres. Coastal artillery units are deployed 
in fortified positions along the southern and 
southwestern coasts as well as in the archipelago. 
The principal tasks of our Air Force are surveillance, 
interception and reconnaissance. Air operations are 
carried out by three Air Defence Wings, which are 
located in Northern, Central and Southern Finland. 
The deployment of flying units can be flexibly changed 
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to support any military area. For this purpose, seven 
major air bases and number of highway airstrips are 
maintained. Besides, all civilian airports can be 
utilized. 
A network of long-range radars is supplemented by 
mobile and stationary low-altitude radars. Air 
surveillance is complemented by the Frontier and 
Coast Guards and the air-traffic controls of the 
National Board of Aviation. 
Most anti-aircraft troops are organizationally part of 
the Army, but their fire control is integrated into the 
overall air defence. Our anti-aircraft system is at the 
moment undergoing an intense modernization 
programme. 
Preparedness 	The strength of our peacetime defence force is about 
40.000 men. In their basic preparedness, they carry 
out surveillance of the Finnish land and sea territory 
and airspace 24 hours a day. Command, control, 
communications and intelligence systems are also 
continuously operational. 
Preparedness is vital for our territorial defence. 
Accordingly, the military districts have the main 
responsibility for mobilization. Training units have 
two peacetime functions. They have their training 
responsibilities, and they secure mobilization. 
Defensive operations can be quickly launched even 
in the case of surprise attacks, since the training units 
are the initial force to be mobilized. 
Mobilization is a key element in our defence. It will 
cover the whole country and will be implemented 
mainly by mobilizing small units close to their areas 
of operation. 
During a threat of war, forces can be flexibly generated 
to match any level of threat. The idea is to first 
reinforce the training units and then, if required, 
mobilize wartime units. A force of about 250.000 
men, which we call a fast deployment force, can be 
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mobilized through accelerated measures within a 
few days. 
This fast deployment force comprises most units of 
the Frontier Guards, units for reconnaissance and 
surveillance, anti-aircraft units as well as up to 13 
Army brigades. At this stage, the Navy and the Air 
Force will have some 90 per cent of their wartime 
strength. The fast deployment force is equipped with 
modern armament and equipment to intensify 
surveillance and reconnaissance, to repel violators of 
the territory and to protect vital military and civilian 
objects. 
If and when needed, Finland is ready for total 
mobilization. The fully mobilized wartime Defence 
Forces consist of approximately 530.000 men drawn 
from a pool of one million trained reservists. 
The mobilized troops are divided into local and 
general forces and support troops. Local forces form 
a basic network for our territorial defence system. 
They carry out local defence, surveillance, guarding 
and delaying actions. They are also capable of ranger-
type warfare in the rear of the aggressor. The mobile 
general forces, army corps and brigade level 
formations, detachments and other units are 
intended for strategically important operations. They 
will be deployed upon the infrastructure set up by 
the local forces. The backbone of the wartime Army 
will comprise 11 modern jaeger brigades (type Brigade 
90),14 infantry brigades of an older type (Brigade 89) 
and two armoured brigades. Support troops do not 
participate in combat but carry out various service 
tasks to support combat troops. 
Troops, 	The jaeger brigade is the basic general-force formation 
armament and 	in the Army. In its wartime strength, it will consist of 
equipment 	four battalions, an anti-tank missile company, an 
artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft battalion and other 
necessary arms, 6.800 men in all. These wartime 
brigades (Brigade 90) are undergoing modernization. 
They will be armed with modern light weapons, light 
and heavy mortars, field guns, anti-tank and anti-
aircraft missiles. Their communications systems will 
be integrated and automatic. The infantry in these 
brigades will be transported to the battle zone in their 
all-terrain vehicles or in armoured personnel carriers. 
The local forces of the Army are organized into 
companies and battalions. The armament and 
equipment of the units depend on their tasks. Some 
of these units will defend local objects, such as air 
bases and ports. They are equipped also with heavy 
weapons, e.g. field guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
weapons. The units which will stay and fight the 
aggressor at its rear, are equipped with light arms 
suitable for ranger-type warfare. 
The Finnish coastal defence system exploits effectively 
our shallow waters and the extensive archipelago as 
well as the severe climatic conditions. For several 
months each year, most of our coastal waters are 
covered by thick ice. 
The coastal defence system consists of fixed sensor 
and radar surveillance and a computerized command 
and fire-control network. Its chain of fortified light 
and heavy gun batteries are backed up by mobile 
missile and artilleryunits, The Navy has at its disposal 
two corvettes, 15 modern fast attack craft as well as 
mine layers, mine sweepers and a number of auxiliary 
vessels. The fast attack craft are equipped with 
missiles. Almost every vessel has mine-laying 
capacity, which is essential in our shallow territorial 
waters. 
In our defence system, the main emphasis is on the 
Army. However, we pay special attention to our 
airspace. The tasks of the Air Force are to prevent 
violations of airspace in peacetime and during a 
threat of war, and to intercept aggressors in wartime. 
These tasks are carried out by 60 all-weather 
interceptors. The Air Force also employs some 50 
advanced jet trainers. 
Procurement 	During the past decade the focus of procurement has 
plans 	 been in arming and equipping thenewjaegerbrigades 
and armoured brigades of the fast deployment force. 
This trend will prevail up to the mid 90s when the 
modernization of the interceptors of the Air Force 
will begin. Air Defence will be developed also by 
acquiring medium-range surface-to-air missile 
systems. The Navy will get a missile craft unit in 
addition to the two already existing. 
The Finnish Defence Forces have been developed 
taking into account the large size of our territory, the 
harsh climatic and geographic conditions and our 
national resources. It is not for us to change these 
conditions. Instead, we make maximum use of 
them. That is why we are convinced of the capability 
of our Defence Forces to fulfil their mission. 
MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND MILITARY TRAINING 
IN THE FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES 
Statement on item 3.B by Major General Matti Kopra 
Seminar on Military Doctrine 
30 January 1990 
To a large extent, the defence of Finland relies on 
mobilization. As previously stated byt my delegation, 
our peacetime units have two main tasks: to train 
personnel and to keep up permanent preparedness. 
Training takes place separately in the Army, Navy 
and Air Force. The Frontier and Coast Guards, which 
are subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, 
employ the same training principles and procedures 
as the Defence Forces. 
Training of 	Under the Conscription Act, all Finnish men between 
those liable for the ages of 17 and 60 are liable for military service. 
military service When not in active service, a man belongs to the 
reserve until the age of 50 or 60 years depending on 
military rank or specialization. 
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A conscript may be exempted from active service in 
peacetime on medical or ethical grounds. More than 
85 per cent of all men perform their national service 
in full. 
The training of those liable for military service consists 
of conscript training and refresher training for 
reservists. 
The length of conscript service is 240, 285 or 330 days 
depending on rank and specialization. Each age class 
enters service in five contingents in the course of two 
years. Each contingent consists of about 12.000 men. 
The conscripts go through an identical basic training 
period of ten weeks in all services. This ensures that 
every Finnish reservist has similar basic military 
skills. These skills include the use of light anti-tank 
weapons, demolition works and survival in small 
independent units. This is essential for ranger-type 
warfare and our territorial defence system. The basic 
training is followed by specialized training tailored 
to the needs of each service. Because of our small-unit 
tactics, we emphasize the independence and 
initiative of commanders on all levels. 
On the average, 8 per cent of the conscripts are 
trained to be reserve officers, 28 per cent to be reserve 
non-commissioned officers and 64 per cent for tasks 
in the ranks. 
Refresher training is based on the Conscription Act 
under which those liable for military service can be 
called up for refresher training. The maximum total 
amount of refresher training, carried out at different 
times, is 40 to 100 days depending on rank and 
specialization. Each year about 50.000 men are called 
up. 
Refresher training includes exercises for commanders 
and other key personnel, for units and headquarters, 
and for mobilization personnel. 
All personnel in charge of key duties in units and 
headquarters are trained in special courses. For the 
performance of the units, the training of this personnel 
is crucial. The so-called fast deployment force—which 
is to be mobilized first — has naturally a priority in 
refresher training. 
Refresher training for combat units and headquarters 
is carried out usually in periods of 7 to 14 days. After 
this training, the units can be rapidly mobilized. 
They will be quickly combat-ready and, time 
allowing, capable of starting combat training on 
their own. 
Training of 	The strength of the regular personnel of the Defence 
regular personnel Forces is about 21.000. Half of them are military. The 
training of all regular officers and warrant officers is 
carried out at the institutions of military education 
and training as well as in the units. 
The basic training of officers is given at the military 
academies. The cadet courses in these academies now 
last for three years, but will be extended to about four 
years in 1991. The general aim is to educate officers to 
be company-level commanders in wartime. 
Approximately 120 lieutenants graduate each year. 
The first task of an army lieutenant is to train conscripts 
as their platoon leader. In theAirForce, practically all 
junior officers are fighter pilots. Their training is 
concentrated on air combat. The dissimilar-type air 
combat training is continuously carried out in every 
squadron. In the Navy, lieutenants are trained for 
special tasks aboard combat ships. 
After three to four years, an officer attends a captain 
course of his service and arm. This course lasts 8 to 10 
months. Officers who have completed this course are 
qualified to be wartime battalion-level commanders. 
The general staff officer examination qualifies to the 
ranks of colonel and above. It aims at educating 
officers to be wartime brigade-level commanders. 
The examination is taken in the War College after 
courses lasting two to three years. Some 70 majors 
graduate as general staff officers from the War College 
every second year. 
The field training of active-service officers takes place 
in different parts of the country so as to acquaint 
them with the specific geographic conditions of each 
area. 
The basic training of warrant officers is provided at 
the Warrant Officer School and other institutions of 
military education. Basic training lasts for about two 
years. In addition to this, there is a training period of 
six months in units. This training qualifies warrant 
officers to be wartime company- level commanders. 
The Finnish military training system allows for no 
shortcut for regular personnel. All our officers have 
completed their national service as conscripts. They 
have begun their careers from the lowest level and 
are thus thoroughly familiar with the life of the 
ordinary private, seaman or airman. 
Exercises 	The exercise programme has been geared to test and 
improve the Finnish territorial defence system. Every 
second year, the Defence Forces organizes a major 
exercise with approximately 10.000 to 15.000 men 
participating. On a lower level and in a smaller scale, 
brigade- and battalion-level manoeuvres are 
organized under military area command. Also, 
operational air defence training, combined naval 
defence exercises and joint staff exercises of all services 
are regularly included in exercise programmes. 
However, the main emphasis is put on battalion- and 
company-level exercises in local training areas. 
Peace-keeping 	Finland has participated in the UN peace-keeping 
activities 	operations since 1956. To this day, almost 26.000 
Finnish soldiers have participated in various UN 
missions. 
About 90 per cent of the Finnish peace-keepers are 
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reservists, who participate in the operations on a 
voluntary basis. 
At the moment, almost 1 900 Finnish soldiers are 
serving under the UN flag. We maintain battalions in 
Lebanon, Golan and Namibia, and contingents and 
observers in Kashmir, Cyprus, the Middle East and 
Afghanistan as well as in Iran and Iraq. 
A special UN Training Centre has been set up in 
Finland to train peace-keepers. Besides, the Centre 
contributes to the joint Nordic training of UN military 
observers. 
Other duties 	The Defence Forces are legally obliged to provide 
of the FDF assistance to other authorities when requested. Such 
assistance includes search and rescue operations, 
forest fires and other natural catastrophes. 
Qualified and motivated people are essential for the 
military defence of Finland. Therefore, the Finnish 
Defence Forces emphasizes the importance of 
educating and training its personnel. By intense, 
disciplined and continuous training we make sure 
that every Finnish soldier can and will defend his 
country. 
MILITARY BUDGETING AND PLANNING IN FINLAND 
Statement on item 3. C by Dr. Pauli Järvenpää 
Seminar on Military Doctrine 
31 January 1990 
Military budgeting and planning does not, of course, 
take place in a vacuum. The Finnish system of 
territorial defence is a purely defensive system. It is 
also a system that places special demands on the 
structure and training of troops. 
This, together with the particular climatic and 
geographic conditions prevailing in the North, puts 
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special requirements on the kinds of military 
equipment to be used. Mobility, for example, is better 
to be based on light armoured personnel carriers and 
all-terrain vehicles rather than on heavier armoured 
vehicles. Let me give another examle. Since the bulk 
of the weapon systems will be used by the reservists, 
most of these systems must be fairly simple to handle, 
yet effective. 
These considerations are reflected in Finland's 
military budgeting and planning. With relatively 
low military budgets, we have been able to create a 
viable military posture. 
Defence budgeting is an integral part of national 
budgeting and planning. The national budget is 
prepared by the Government to be approved by 
Parliament. All defence expenditure is included in 
the budget, which is a public document. 
Budgetary planning, carried out by the Defence Forces 
Headquarters, consists of three overlapping stages: a 
long-term plan extending over 15 years, a medium-
term plan covering 5 years, and a short-term plan 
that in fact is the same as the annual budget proposal 
submitted by the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry 
of Finance. The long-term plan is renewed every 5 
years and the medium-term plan every year. 
The long-term plan is an internal planning device for 
the Defence Forces. It sets objectives and draws 
guidelines for the development of the Defence Forces 
over the next 15-year period. It is based on the 
projected long-term trends affecting Finland's security 
environment, including demographic changes and 
advances in military technology. 
While the long-term plan is an internal planning 
guideline for the Defence Forces, the medium-term 
plan is strictly guided and shaped according to the 
financial and personnel resources allocated by the 
Ministry of Finance in its general guidelines for 
budgetary planning. The medium-term is worked 
out in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence. The 
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emphasis in the medium-term plan is placed on 
procurement and systems development. 
The short-term plan covers essentially the first year 
of the medium-term plan, supplemented by 
budgetary needs that have arisen during the year's 
planning process. In its final shape the plan is the 
budget proposal of the Ministry of Defence that in 
due course will be discussed by the Government and 
considered in Parliament, which makes the final 
decisions on appropriations. 
Defence appropriations are normally approved for 
one fiscal year only. However, for major weapons 
programs it is possible for Parliament to approve 
special "procurement authorizations", spanning a 
period of several years. Even such authorizations 
must be annually reaffirmed by Parliament. 
As noted above, defence budgets are subject to 
thorough public scrutiny in Parliament. Since the 
early 1970's there have been a number of ad hoc 
Parliamentary Defence Committees. They have 
provided a forum for defence debates and 
parliamentary input on national defence policy 
formulation. The Committee recommendations have, 
for example, provided planning guidelines for the 
Defence Forces long-term plan I already referred to. 
Now to the question of resource allocation. Budgetary 
practices vary considerably from one country to 
another. In Finland, the budgetary term "military 
expenditure" refers to a national budget heading 
that covers all the financial resources allocated to the 
Defence Forces each year. This includes the salaries 
of personnel, procurement of defence materiel, 
operations and maintenance costs, maintenance of 
conscripts as well as real estate and construction 
costs. 
That budget heading also includes the Ministry of 
Defence administrative costs, Finland's United 
Nations peace-keeping expenses and the cost of 
running the production plants administered by the 
ministry of Defence. 
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For the fiscal year 1990, 7.2 billion Fmk, or about 1.8 
billion US dollars at the present rate of conversion, 
was allocated to the Defence Forces under the budget 
heading of military expenditure. That sum can be 
broken down to the following major expence 
categories: 29 per cent of the total will be spent on 
salaries, 33 per cent on procurement of new defence 
materiel, 16 per cent on operations and maintenance, 
and 9 per cent on maintenance of conscripts. 
The total defence budget is estimated to represent a 
little less than 1.5 per cent of Finlands's Gross National 
Product (GNP) and about 5 per cent of the total 
national budget. However, there are certain defence-
related costs that do not appear in the national budget 
under the heading of military expenditure. Such 
expenses include, for example, the running costs of 
the Frontier and Coast Guards, which in peace-time 
are budgeted and administered by the Ministry of 
the Interior, but which can be partially or fully 
integrated into the Defence Forces in the event of 
crisis or war. Furthermore, the defence budget does 
not include the costs of civil defence construction or 
the costs of economic preparedness (emergency 
stockpiling). Neither does the defence budget include 
military pensions or social benefits to the families of 
the conscripts. 
In terms of resources expended all of these items 
mentioned here are relatively small. If all of them are 
counted in, the total sum spent on national defence 
will amount to about 2 per cent of GNP. 
The figures presented here have remained stable for 
the past quarter of a century. In the years 1972-89, the 
average annual growth rate of the defence budgets 
was about 3.7 per cent in real terms. The relative 
scarcity of funds available for national defence has 
meant that priorities must have been set with great 
care. 
Let me illustrate this point: With the Navy getting a 
relatively constant share of around 15 per cent of the 
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budget, the choice for special focus has been between 
the Air Force and the Army. When the Air Force 
needs were held as a priority in the late 1970s with 
the purchase of fighters and jet trainers, the Air 
Force's share of the materiel acquisition budget was 
about 50 per cent. At that time, the Army received 
about 30 per cent of the budget. 
An Army modernization program was launched in 
the early 1980s. Since then the Army has received the 
lion's share of the budget so that about a half of the 
new acquisitions have gone to the Army. There will 
be another shift in spending priorities towards air 
defence in the middle of this decade, when the Air 
Force fighter squadrons will be modernized. 
What about the future? It seems fair to say that the 
future portends some especially severe challenges 
for the military planning of a small neutral State. One 
such challenge is the cost of high technology. Finland 
now produces about 40 per cent of its defence material, 
while the rest of it is purchased evenly from East and 
West, as is fitting for a neutral country. The 
domestically produced weapons include ligth arms, 
mortars, heavy artillery, armoured personnel carriers, 
fast attack craft, and, increasingly, communications 
equipment and other highly advanced electronics. 
Although most of the reserve forces can do with less 
sophisticated weapons, the quality of the equipment 
for the best-equipped forces will have tobe 
maintained on a high level even in the future. 
Another challenge will be the availability of the 
resources earmarked for national defence. This 
problem is particularly acute as the prices of defence 
equipment have in the 1980's risen at an annual 
average rate of about 6 per cent in real terms over the 
prices of other goods, and in some categories of 
defence equipment even faster. One consolation 
may be that this seems to be a predicamet faced by 
defence planners and decision-makers in all countries, 
large or small. 
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Finland's military budgeting and planning is an 
integral part of the country's defence policy. Its aim 
is to create and maintain such a defence capability 
that the country's defensive military posture can be 
sustained. In our view, by doing our share and doing 
it well we can best contribute to the security and 
stability of Europe in our own northern corner. 
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